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I. COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Tax Commission, at page 1 of its Brief, states "as a point of emphasis, 
we note that this case is not about taxing Barry Dunn or his income." At page 2, 
the Commission again states Idaho is not taxing Barry Dunn or his income. Page 
2 also states that Idaho is "taxing the interest that Linda Dunn has in her 
community income." Linda Dunn's community income is not the issue, it is 
Barry's wages. At footnote 10, page 12, the Commission states "nor does it even 
mean that it is taxing Barry Dunn's Texas wages." The Commission argues, at 
page 18, "The taxation in this case is not on Barry Dunn or his wages." The tax 
is on Barry Dunn's wages. At page 9, the Commission states ''Texas law is clear 
that the sole-management community property is not the equivalent of separate 
property." At page 14 the Commission states: "The facts of this case present no 
violation of the United States Commerce Clause, or the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause." 
Appellant, Linda Dunn, disputes all these arguments. The Commission is 
taxing Barry Dunn's income. The reason is that when the personal income is 
earned in another state, the residency state must yield to the source state where 
the personal income is earned. If the state where the income is earned does not 
-1-
tax it but the state of residence taxes the income, there is no internal consistency 
and the residence income tax is invalid. Where there is a conflict of what law 
applies, the law that has the most significant relationship to the issue applies. 
Significant relationship depends on where "the spouse who acquired the property 
was domiciled at the time of acquisition." Seizer v. Sessions, 132 Wash.2d 642, 
651, 940 P.2d 261 (Wash. 1997). 
Barry Dunn earned and was paid the wages in Texas where he was a 
resident and domiciled. He was not an Idaho resident. Linda Dunn's Opening 
Brief, page 6, notes that she pays Idaho sales tax. The basic facts cannot be 
scrambled. The reason is that the arguments ignore that Linda Dunn's source is 
out of Idaho. In Texas, Linda Dunn has no interest in Barry Dunn's wages. They 
are treated as separate property before marriage. Washington State also applies 
the source rule. Linda Dunn had no interest in Barry Dunn's wages. Linda Dunn 
did not earn the wages. The wages were "owned" by Barry Dunn. In the states 
where Barry Dunn personally earned the wages, there is no state income tax. The 
residency of the person sought to be taxed on the income earned by a non Idaho 
resident in Texas does not control. The Commission states, at page 6, "Moreover, 
income received from an out-of-state source is clearly taxable." The state of 
source income tax law applies, not the state of residence. If the state of residence 
-2-
taxes the income higher, as it does here, the tax is the equivalent of a tariff and 
invalid. When the source is Texas, the non-earner spouse has no right to the 
income. It cannot be levied on to pay the non-earner's debts. The dormant 
Commerce Clause voids the Idaho tax. 
II. ARGUMENT 
1. The Issue Is Clearly One of Law; The District Court Opinion 
is not Entitled to Deference. 
This is a free review case as clearly only a question of law is presented. 
Therefore, this Court will start from the beginning without deference to the 
District Court opinion. Student Loan Fund of Idaho v. Payette County, 138 Idaho 
684, 687, 69 P.3d 104 (2003). 
2. The Commission would collect against Linda Dunn if she 
didn't pay. The distinction is meaningless. 
The Commission argues, at page 11, that the state ofldaho is only assessing 
a tax and is not seeking the wages of Mr. Dunn to satisfy a debt. The Commission 
also argues that "Appellant's Brief is unable to identify a single case that supports 
the theory," i.e. sole management community property. Both these contentions 
are nullified by Beal Bank v. Gilbert, 417 S.W. 3d 704 (C.A. Tex. 2013). The Court 
stated: 
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Texas recognizes both sole and joint m,anagement community 
property. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.102 (West 2006); Douglas v. 
Delp, 987 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tex. 1999). Sole management 
community property is that property which, though acquired during 
the marriage, would have belonged to a spouse if single. Douglas, 
987 S.W.2d at 883; see also TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 3.102(a). Sole 
management community property includes (1) personal earnings; (2) 
revenue from separate property; (3) recoveries for personal injuries; 
and (4) the increase and mutations of, and the revenue from, all 
property subject to the spouse's sole management, control, and 
disposition. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 3.102(a). Marital property 
subject to the sole management, control, and disposition of one 
spouse is not subject to any non-tortious liability of the other spouse. 
TEX.FAM.CODE ANN.§ 3.202(b)(2) (West Supp.2013); Moss v. Gibbs, 
370S.W.2d 452, 455 (Tex. 1963); Viera v. Viera, 331 S.W.3d 195, 205 
n. 10 (Tex.App. El Paso 2011, no pet.). 
Id. at 709-10. 
The suit in Beal was to collect a non-management spouse's (husband's) debt 
from the other spouse's sole management community property. The sole 
management community property was revenue from separate property which, 
along with personal earnings, is defined as sole management community property 
acquired during marriage. The holding denied collection by the judgment creditor 
of the husband. The case also establishes that time of inception determines the 
character of the property. Id. at 709. The case applies here. The Commission, at 
page 11, argues that it is not attempting to "satisfy a debt". Additional Texas 
cases establishing special community property are Montemayor v. Ortiz, 208 
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S.W.3d 627, 642-3 (C.A. Tex. 2006); and Douglas v. Delp, 987 S.W.2d 879, 883 
(S.C. Tex. 1999). Barry Dunn's wages are sole management community property. 
At page 10 and throughout the Commission's Brief, an attempt is made to 
distinguish separate property and sole management community property. Both 
are treated as separate property acquired before marriage. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. 
§§ 3.102, 3.101. No exception applies in this case. The important law is that the 
non management spouse, here Linda Dunn, has no legal right or interest in the 
property, whether called community or separate. Sole management community 
property is not liable for debts, including taxes incurred, by the non-managing 
spouse. Formal linguistics must give way to pragmatics. The statement, by Robin 
Cook in his book "Crisis", applies. "If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, it's 
a duck!" This overused idiom applies. It is not the label, but the effect that 
counts. The earnings of Barry Dunn do not create an interest in his spouse as 
they are not subject to Linda Dunn's non tort debts, including tax debts. 
Contrary to the Commission's statement, a page 7, Barry Dunn's wages are the 
equivalent of separate property. 
3. The Tax is a Debt. 
If the Commission only assessed and does not satisfy a debt there would be 
no need for Linda Dunn to file a bond. I.C. 63-3050 provides that any tax owed 
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is a debt owed to the state and "May be collected by lien foreclosure or sued for 
and recovered in any proper form of action." The Attorney General enforces the 
tax lien, I.C. 63-3056. The Tax Commission can seize property to pay taxes, I.C. 
63-3057. The statement that the wages of Barry Dunn is not seeking Idaho tax 
to satisfy a debt contradicts I.C. 63-3050 as a tax deficiency "shall constitute a 
debt to the state of Idaho." The District Court's observation was not correct. 
4. The Texas Community Property Law Controls. 
The Commission, in a footnote at page 7, f. 2, informs the Court that Idaho 
community property laws might have applied. The Commission, at page 5, argues 
that Linda Dunn does not substantially dispute that Washington law also 
prohibits the tax. This is incorrect. Linda Dunn, at page 15 of her Brief, cites 
Seizer v. Sessions, 132 Wash.2d 643, 940 P.2d 261 (Wash. 1997) and other 
significant relationship cases at pages 14 and 15 of her Opening Brief. These 
cases review the issue of determining what law applies and applied the most 
significant relationship test. Seizer, supra at 649. The place of acquisition of 
movable property determines what community property law applies. Washington, 
like Texas, also has no income tax. The law where the wages were earned by the 
non resident is applied. Washington's community property statutes, unlike Texas, 
do not define wages as the equivalent of separate property. However, the dormant 
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Commerce Clause also applies to Washington income as crossing state lines 
creates the tariff effect. No tax is disproportionate to tax on half. 
5. The U.S. Constitution's Dormant Commerce Clause Applies To 
Prevent Idaho From Taxing Linda Dunn on Barry Dunn's Wages. 
The Commission Argues, at page 14, that the dormant Commerce Clause 
does not apply to thjs case. Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne,_ U.S._, 135 
S.Ct. 1787, 191 L.Ed.2d 813 (2015), unequivocally holds that when a resident of 
one state earns personal income from an out-of-state source, U.S. Constitution's 
dormant Commerce Clause, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, is implicated. When "tax schemes 
that inherently discriminate against interstate commerce without regard to the tax 
policies of the other State" the internal consistency test is applicable. Id. at 1802. 
The Wynne court treated the income tax like a tariff. Id. at 1804. Like a state 
tariff. Id. at 1794. Taxing wages earned in Texas burdened interstate commerce. 
The burden on interstate commerce is to make sure the total tax is the same. Id. 
at 1805. Wynne included personal state income tax within the Interstate 
Commerce Clause that grants Congress the power to regulate commerce among 
the several states. Id at 1794. Any time a state taxes personal income earned in 
another state, more heavily than the state of source, the dormant Commerce 
Clause is violated. The aim is to prevent economic balkanization as the tax on 
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out-of-state income acts as a tariff. Parker v. Idaho Tax Commission, 148 Idaho 
842, 230 P.3d 734 (2010) at 84 7 held that the Commerce Clause is not implicated 
unless the taxpayer "demonstrates" that the "income has an identifiable interstate 
activity or market." Wynne abolished any such test. The factual basis is 
comparison. Parker also stipulated that the state of residence, Idaho, not the sate 
of source, applied. Id. at 846. The Idaho Supreme Court, like all other state 
courts, is bound by the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal 
Constitution and law. James v. City of Boise,_ U.S._ 136, S.Ct. 685, 193 
L.Ed. 694 (2016); Williams v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 2156, 195 L.Ed.2d 819 (2016); 
and Alexander v. Stribal, 161 Idaho 253, 385 P.3d 431, 443 f 4. (2016). Wynne 
applies here as the state of Idaho taxes the out-of-state income, but the states of 
source do not. The tax is discriminatory. Here, Idaho taxes income exempt in 
Texas where it was earned in Texas; Idaho is taxing out-of-state income. The 
Wynne's were Maryland residents who earned pass through subchapter S income 
from other states. No income was earned in Maryland. The Court considered the 
pass through income as personal income. Wynne, supra 1803, 1804. The only 
issue in the case was a county tax capped at 3.2%. Both were held to be state 
taxes. Id. at 1792. Maryland did not allow a credit for the county tax. The 
Supreme Court held that the tax violated the dormant Commerce Clause and was 
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invalid. The Court stated "Maryland's tax scheme is inherently discriminatory and 
operates as a tariff." Id. at 1804. If income that crosses state lines is taxed 
higher than if the income is only earned in one state, the internal consistency test 
is violated and the tax is invalid. Idaho is attempting to tax Linda Dunn in the 
same way as the Wynnes as the income sought to be taxed to them was earned in 
other states. Barry Dunn earned the wages in other states that had no income 
tax. At source, no income tax had to be paid. Like the Wynne's subchapter S 
income, only residency was considered. There was no tax at the source, i.e. Texas. 
Idaho wants a tax based on residence. This is a discriminatory tariff. Barry 
Dunn's wage income, at least hypothetically, crossed state lines as Idaho wants 
to tax it as Linda Dunn's community property. In Texas, the non-earner spouse 
has no interest in the earner spouse's wages. This gives commerce clause 
scrutiny as these are the same facts as the facts of Wynne. Maryland, where the 
Wynnes were residents, taxes all income of its residents regardless of where the 
income is earned. Wynne, id. at 1798. Wynne also concludes that a state may tax 
all income, even income earned outside the jurisdiction without violating the Due 
Process Clause. However, "Similarly, Maryland's raw power to tax its residents 
out-of-state income does not insulate its tax scheme from scrutiny under the 
dormant Commerce Clause." Id. at 1799. Wynne quotes Annco v. Hardesty, 467 
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U.S. 638, 642, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984). A state "may not tax a 
transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it 
occurs entirely within a state." Wynne, id. at 1794 (internal quotes omitted). 
Wynne adopted rules of interstate commerce to state income tax of individuals 
earned in other states. The comparison was a personal county income tax. The 
Maryland law does not allow residents a credit for county tax. The result was that 
the county tax could be taxed twice. The states of comparison are state of 
residence compared to income earned elsewhere. This comparison fits the Dunns. 
The dormant Commerce Clause applies. Idaho taxes Barry Dunn's wages more 
heavily than Texas and Washington. The Commission notes, at page 13, that 
Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 393 P.2d 35 (1964) applies. In Herndon, both 
Oklahoma tax and Idaho tax was paid on income earned within Oklahoma. Id. at 
338. The above discussion applies. Residents can be taxed on income earned in 
other states. The issue if it is taxed higher and no credit is allowed, the tax 
statute is invalid. Wynne abrogates Herndon. "Bob will pay more income tax than 
April solely because he earns income interstate. Specifically, Bob will have to pay 
1.25% tax twice, once to a state where he resides and once in state B where he 
earns the income." Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804. No credits were involved in 
Herndon and "the tax scheme fails the internal consistency test." Wynne, S.Ct. 
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at 1803. The facts of Herndon fit Wynne. The dormant Commerce Clause is 
violated. 
The Commission ignores Linda Dunn's argument, pages 7-10, that 
Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, _U.S. __ , 135 S.Ct. 1787, 191 
L.Ed.2d 813 (2015) is new law. "The question before the Court in Wynne was 
whether in the face of over lapping claims to the same income by the state of 
residence and the state of source, the former must yield to the latter." Walter 
Hellerstein, "Deciphering the Supreme Court's Opinion in Wynne," 123 Journal of 
Taxation 4, July 2015 (copy attached in Appendix). An income tax earned in the 
source state that was tax free in the source state could not be taxed in the state 
of residence if it creates additional tax burdens when state lines are crossed. 
States taxing income on a residence basis must yield to source if a risk of unequal 
taxation is the result. Barry Dunn, a non resident, earned wages in Texas and 
Washington, states that do not tax wage income. His spouse, Linda, did not earn 
the income. The Commission wan ts to tax Linda solely on the basis of her 
residency. The dormant Commerce Clause is violated. Here, the Texas 
Constitution prohibits state income tax on wages. The joint stipulation R 39-40 
proved that Barry Dunn was a non resident of Idaho and lived and worked in 
Texas. Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at 1796 holds that 
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a tax on individual net income is a direct and immediate burden on interstate 
commerce. Wynne, supra at 1802, applies the economic burden test. When Idaho 
seeks to tax Barry Dunn's wages earned in Texas that were free of Texas income 
tax, the internal consistency test caused disparate discrimination. Washington 
earnings also violate the test, they are tax free in Washington. Idaho Code § 63-
3026A applies to non residents which include Barry Dunn. His income was 
earned outside of Idaho. Failure to apply this Idaho Code Section completes the 
discrimination argument. This statute states income and does not address 
credits. In-state rates favoring in-state hospitals over out-of-state hospitals violate 
Wynne and the dormant Commerce Clause. Mary Hitchcock Hospital v. Cohen, 
2016 WL 1735818 at *4 (D.C. New Hampshire 2016). The discrimination is not 
only on tax credits. It prohibits all forms of economic protectionism. Taxation of 
cross-border transactions between a corporate taxpayer and an out-of-state office 
is discriminatory. Wal-Mart Puerto Rico v. Zaragoza-Gomez, 834 F.3d 110, 126 (1st, 
Cir. 2016). 
6. The Privileges and Immunities Clause is Violated; If Personal 
State (ncome Taxes Discriminate Solely on the basis of 
Residency and Non Residency, they are Invalid. 
Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at 1799, adopted thecaseofCampsNewfound/Otwatonna 
v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 117 S.Ct. 1590, 137 L.Ed.2d 852 (1997) to 
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apply the internal consistency test to the operation of local taxes, as regardless of 
the local situs of the tax, the effect is economic protectionism. Wynne states "[a] 
tax on real estate, like any other tax may impermissibly burden interstate 
commerce." Id. at 1797. Walter Hellerstein, "Deciphering the Supreme Court's 
Opinion in Wynne," 123 Journal of Taxation (July 2015), pages 4, 15, 16 (copy 
attached) discussed this change by Wynne and states that the Wynne reliance on 
Camps/ Newfound now implicates persons who "live in one state and work in 
another" (page 16). Hellerstein states that "it is only a matter of time before these 
actions are launched" referring to source based decisions. Hellerstein cites 
Tamagni v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York, 695 N.E.2d 1125, (C.A. 
N.Y. 1998) a case that held that failure of New York to allow a credit on taxes paid 
to the state of domicile (New Jersey) does not implicate the dormant Commerce 
Clause. "The New York income tax operates to tax residents of this state, without 
regard to their activities in other states, so long as the States definition of resident 
does not violate due process (and there is no claim here that it does), no violation 
of the Commerce Clause is apparent." Id. at 544. The dissent by Judge Titione 
cites Camps/Newfound Owatonna v. Town of Harrison 520 U.S. 564, 117 S.Ct. 
1590, 137 L.Ed.2d 582 (1997) and other cases arguing that the question is not 
whether interstate commerce is affected but whether interstate commerce is taxed. 
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Id. at 546. Tamagini would be decided differently if after Wynne. Parker v . Idaho 
State Tax Commission, 148 Idaho at 848-9, states "the Parkers would need to show 
that the state's taxation of Kathy's entire income has a substantial effect on a 
identifiable interstate economy activity or market.' Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at 1797, 
eliminated the distinction between corporate and individual income taxes. There 
is no longer any identification where out-of-state personal income is an issue on 
state tax cases the scrutiny of unequal burden is automatic. "See Camps 
Newfound, 520 U.S. at 574, 117 S.Ct. 1590 ("a tax on real estate, Like any other 
tax, may impermissibly burden interstate commerce. (Emphasis added.)" (Internal 
quotes disregarded). The examples in Wynne, 135 S.Ct at 1802, point out that a 
person that earns income in another state will pay more. This is a violation of the 
dormant Commerce Clause. A tariff is a tax imposed on imported goods or 
services. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, unabridged ( 1981), "tariff . 
. . (2) a schedule, system, or scheme of duties imposed by a government on 
imported or exported goods for the production of revenue, for the artificial 
fostering of home industries, or as a means of coercing foreign governments to 
grant reciprocity privileges." This is the answer. If the income did not cross state 
lines it would not be taxed if both were Texas (or Washington) residents. The 
county tax in Wynne as on income earned outside the state. Camps Newfound, 
-14-
520 U.S. at 581, states "as our cases make clear, this sort of discrimination is at 
the very core of activities forbidden by the dormant Commerce Clause. [A) state 
may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than 
when it occurs entirely within the State." (Internal quotes omitted). The 
Commission argues, at page 10, that Wynne does not apply since there was no 
"evidence or argument that Linda Dunn was not entitled to a credit for taxes paid 
to another state." The holding in Wynne is that if no credit is allowed for the 
county tax, the dormant Commerce Clause is violated. "Maryland allows them a 
credit against the 'state' tax but not the 'county' tax." Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at 1792. 
Lack of credit was the issue in Wynne. 
7. The Privileges and Immunities Clause Applies. 
The Commission's Brief, at page 6, also argues that the U.S. Constitution's 
Privileges and Immunities Clause is not violated. Lunding v. New York Tax 
Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 118 S.Ct. 766, 139 L.Ed.2d 717 (1998) completely 
rejects this argument. The Privileges and Immunities Clause applies. "Where non 
residents are subject to different treatment there must be 'reasonable' ground for 
diversity of treatment." Citing Travis v. Yale and Towne, 252 U.S. 60, 40 S.Ct. 228, 
64 L.Ed 460 ( 1920) Id. at 298, the Lunding case applied the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, U.S. Const. Art 4, § 2, to invalidate a New York income tax law 
-15-
denying non residents a personal exemption on state taxes but not to non 
residents. The non residents lived in New Jersey that had no income tax. "A state 
may not barter away the right conferred upon its citizens by the Constitution of 
the United States, to enjoy the privileges and immunities when they go to other 
states." Id. at 82. Igoe v. Pataki, 696 N.Y.S.2d 355 (S.C. N.Y. 1999) struck down 
a commuter tax on non residents working in New York but resides in other states. 
The tax violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. "While the state wishes to 
ease the tax burdens for its residents to increase their spending power, residency 
alone is a wholly arbitrary and irrational basis on which to crate distinctions 
among taxpayers." Id. at 364. This case also notes that consumption taxes are 
paid by non residents. Id. at 303. Discriminatory treatment based on a citizen's 
state of residence is a potential violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
Children's Seashore House v. Waldman, 197 F.3d 654, 660 N. 5 (3rd Cir. 1999). 
"5. Likewise, the courts consider discriminatory treatment based on a citizen's 
state or residence a potential violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
See Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 118 S.Ct. 766, 774, 
139 L.Ed.2d 717 (1998) ("where non residents are subject to different treatment, 
there must be a reasonable ground for diversity of treatment") (internal quotations 
omitted)". Texas rejects a state income tax in its Constitution. It also protects a 
-16-
married wage earner from the debts of the non earning spouse. Texas law of the 
source applies. The recent dormant Commerce Clause rejects the residency rule, 
which is the only reason the tax is assessed. The residency rule does not apply 
where the income is earned out of state by the non-wage earner. Idaho taxation 
is a forbidden tariff. It is also a violation of equal protection. County of Alameda 
v. City and County of San Francisco, 97 Cal.Rptr. 175, 19 Cal.App.3d 750 (C.A. 
Cal. 1971). "The city may not accomplish this end by imposing a tax solely upon 
non residents engaged in a particular activity while totally exempting residents 
engaged in the same activity." Id. at 179. 
8. Blangers Applies. 
The Commission, at page 13, footnote 12, argues thatBlangers v. State Dept 
of Revenue and Taxation, 114 Idaho 944,963 P.2d 1052 (1998) does not apply as 
"there is no non resident being taxed by Idaho." The distinction is not logical for 
the reason that Idaho tried to tax non-residents' earnings for services performed. 
Linda Dunn did not earn the wages. Barry Dunn, a non resident, earned the 
wages where there is no income tax. The Court in Blangers relied on lack of 
nexus, the due process clause and that "the trail crews do not owe their livelihood 
to Idaho." Id. at 952. Blangers applies. 
-17-
III. CONCLUSION 
Barry Dunn's wages earned in Texas are his sole property. Linda Dunn has 
no Idaho taxable income from Barry Dunn's Texas wages. The dormant 
Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clauses prohibit taxing non-
resident income in Idaho when the state of the source, including Washington, has 
no state taxation. The refund should be granted. 
Dated February 1 7, 201 7 
Attorney for Linda Dunn, Appellant 
~--"££~ 
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WALTER HELLERSTEIN 
In Wynne, the Supreme Court held that Maryland's personal Income tax 
regime violated the dormant Commerce Clause because It taxed Income 
on a residence and source basis without giving a credit to residents for In· 
come taxed on a source basis by other states. The Court suggested, how· 
ever, that a state may tax residents on all their Income without providing a 
credit for taxes paid by other states If the state did not tax nonresidents on 
Income from sources within the state, even though such a taxing regime 
might result In double taxation of Interstate commerce. 
In Comptrollu of tht Irrasury v. Wynne, 135 
S. Ct. 1787 (2015), the U.S. Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to consider 
the following question: "Does the 
United States Constitution prohibit a 
state from taxing all the income of its 
residents-wherever earned-by man-
dating a credit for taxes paid on in-
come earned in other states?"1 Stated 
somewhat more broadly. the question 
before the Court in Wynne was 
whether, in the face of overlapping 
claims to the same income by the state 
of residence and the state of source, 
the former must yield to the latter as 
a matter of federal constitutional law 
to avoid double taxation. 
The short answer that the Court 
gave to this question in Wyrint was 
·no; even while holding that Mary-
land's tax regime violated the Com-
merce Clause. In response to a dis-
senting opinion's contention that the 
4 @) J O U R NA l. 0 F TA X AT I O N ,. J U LY 2 0 15 
Court's decision "requires a State tax-
ing based on residence to 'recede' to 
a State taxing based on source; the 
Court in Wynne: declared: "We estab-
lish no such rule of priority." Indeed 
the Court went on to suggest, al-
though it explicitly did not hold? that 
under a properly designed tax regime 
Maryland could constitutionally tax 
its residents on all of their income 
without providing any relief from 
taxes imposed by other states.1 More-
over, although Maryland was not: 
constitutionally required to adopt a 
tax, regime under which residence 
yielded to source, the Court made it 
dear that Maryland could have 
avoided the Court's ultimate ruling 
had Maryland in fact adopted such a 
regime: So what did the Court actually 
hold in Wynne, why did it take the an-
alytical route it chose lu reach it1; con-
clusion, and what arc the implications 
of that choice? This article addresses 
those questionSc 
income, its opinion proceeds on the 
premise that the income in question 
is personal income earned by resident 
individuals as distinguished from 
"corporate" income that is included in 
an individual shareholder's tax base 
pursuant to the S corporation eledion, 
The Cowt's Opinion in Wynne 
At first blush, the Court's opinion in 
Wynnt~pl,)~i,\9($lm.ple ~.nd.~traightf:9~-
ward. ~er 'brieffy re~~ing tt}~:fa~ 
miliar history of the Court's dormant 
Commerce Oause doctrine, and with 
a perfunctory nod to Justice Scalia's 
and Justice Thornas's revisionist views 
as to the legitimacy of that doctrine? 
the Court declared that 'our existing 
dormant Commerce Clause cases all 
but dictate the result" namely, the ur.1-
constitutionality of Maryland's taxing 
r{;,gir;i::te, The C;pu,rifound "{tlhree cases 
ihvolving ~tiqn of the income of 
domestic corporations ... particularly 
instructive~ All three cases-J.D. Adams 
Mfg. Co. v. Storm, 304 U.S. 307 (l 938), 
Gwin, Whi.lt f:I Prince, Inc. v. Hmneford. 305 
U.S. 434, (1939), and Central Grtyhound 
Lines, inc. v. Mtalty, 334 U.S. 653 (1948)-
struck down unapportioned gross re-
ceipts t.axes on the ground that they 
burdened interstate commerce by ex-
posing it to the risk of a double or 
multiple tax burden to which in-
trastate commerce was not exposed. 
The Court summarized the import of 
these cases, and their implications for 
Maryland's tax regime, as follows: 'In 
all three of these cases, the Court 
struck down a state tax scheme that 
might have resulted in double taxa-
tion ofincome earned out of th.e State 
and that discrimina.ted in favor of in-
trastate over interstate economic ac-
tivity .... Maryland's tax sr.hemc is 
unconstitutional for similar reasons~ 
The Court further observed that al-
though these cases did not invoke the 
Court's "internal consistency• doc-
trine-which was hardly a surprise be-
cause the doctrine would not be ar-
ticulated for another 40 yearse-they 
nevertheless, in substance, reflected 
the application of the doctrine. As the 
Court later described the doctrine in 
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, 
Inc., 514 U.S.175 (1995): "Internal con-
sistency is preserved when the impo-
sition of a tax identical to the one in 
question by every other State would 
add no burden to interstate t.'Ommerce 
that intrastate commerce would not 
also bear. This test asks nothing about 
the economic reality .reflected by the 
WYNNE:fflESHORTVERSION 
Maryland imposes an income tax on 
its residents with respect to all income 
earned regardless of source. The tax 
has bo1h a state and a county compo-
nent. although both levies are state 
tax:es,4 with the rate of the county com-· 
ponent depending on the taxpayer's 
county of residence, and ranging from 
3.2% to 1.25%. Although both the state 
and county components of the tax ap-
ply to the resident's income regardless 
of source, and thus potentially to in-
come that is taxable in other states, 
Maryland limited the credit it granted 
for taxes its residents paid to other 
states to the state portion of the tax. 
and it provided no credit for any tax 
imposed by other states for the county 
portion of the tax. Maryland also taxes 
nonresidents on income from sources 
within the state. Like the tax on resi-
dents, the tax on nonresidents has 
both a state anc) county component. 
with the county component levied, at 
the lowest county rate, to wit., 1.250/o. 
The state component of the tax was 
unproblematic from a Commerce 
Clause standpoint because of the full 
credit granted against the state com-
ponent for taxes paid to other states.• 1 =:c:;::,iLc.omptro11erotrheueasuryv. :=not~':!:i!;t:!;:'~~~~ 
Consequently.the focus of the Court's i As de<"...albed more 1unv below, ttte Court's reasoning come by Maryland This IS the Is the way wtually aa 
opinion was on the county portion of 1n WynnesuggeststhatMarvlandcould·remedythe llleometaxcredltlr1Qreg1mesoperate.SeeHeUerste11\ 
the state tax. =nstltut/Onallty cl Its tax scheme' by adop1ing a State n»<at/on Treatise, sup-a note 4. 1 20JO: SectlOn 
schemcthattaxedonlYon thet>aslsof residence Tiw 904 Cleaeral foreign tax credit llrnlta!lonl 
Brian and Karen Wynne were Courtwasquk:ktoobser11e,howeVef.that"wedonot 6 The states employ a variety of means ror assuring 
Maryland residents. During the year aeclde the constttutlonallty of a hypothetical tax that nonresidents corporation shareholders pay 
t . (2006) B . Wynn d scheme Iha! Maryland might adapt because such a taxes on Ulelr pass,,through Income /rom sources 
a . issue , nan e owne scheme IS not before ur,:, wltllln the state. oltfln t,y condltlOnlnQ pass-ttrough 
stock in a Subchapter S corporation, 3 See tei<t accompanying notes 28·30 ''*"· tseatment on the nonresklent stiarehOlders' agree-
which filed ~iate income tax returns 4 Thts Is tsue as a matter ot state law. see Frey v. Comp- ment to Ille returns or by having the s corporatlOn 
Th W ed lro/ler of /he TrW$KY, 29 A,3d 475 (Mel., 2011). and wltf"llold taxes rrom (or pay taxes on behalf of) their in 39 states. e ynnes earn in- wouldhavebeentrueasamatterottectera1arat1tu- shareholders,SeeHeUersteln.State Taxauon Treattse. 
come passed through to them from t1ona1 law.even If thecoonty-tevel tax were lnder.Je1ld· suP1a note 4, 120.00[2Jlal(U1l 
the S Corporation, and they reported. ent of the state4ewi tax for state law iJUf'PO".,!?S.'For 7 See Helerstelt\ Stille Taxat/on Troot/se,SIJP'a note 4. 
federal comtltutlonal purposes, the dl!illnctlon be· 'II 4J2[21 (discussing Justice Scalla's and Justice 
the income on their individual Mary- tween state and local t:axEs hasnomeanlro-tlley are Thomas·s challenge 10 the Court's dormant Com-
land income tax returns, daiming a aUexer~ot·s1a1e·power1nsorarastheConst1tu· 
Uon Is concerned, See Hetlersteln. Hetle!stt~n. and merre Clause doctrine). 
credit for income taxes paid to other swain. state Taxation. Third Edition (Thomson 8 TheSupremeCourt,llrstsuggestedt:hatthepr/tqlle 
states.' When the Maryland Comp- Reuters/WG&L. 2015 rev.>. 1 l!l.02[91 (hereinafter of ·1ntema1 consistency· corislralned state taxing 
Hellersleln. Stalt• Taxa/lOn TreallSe>. Heller stein. "Fed· power In Container COiµ of America v. Franchise Tax 
troll er of the Treasury allo:v,r~d the eral Constltuuonal Res!faln~ CJ!1 State Property Tax Board. 46.3 u.s. 159 (1983).See generaQyMellerstein. • 
· .. · .. ''""""···· .•' '1\'Ni.dlfror·\h.(!!sfufe),p'{),rl1!m ,<:'if 6.)~li\K :-'~A~itl:li~M:~~WiW -··· ""lif,oi~'fo~ii'~~?:,~~'<in'11tt- · -···· ·· ··· 
but denied it for the county portion tiiiit/ ProPQSi>ls.' siaielax Notes.6/11i07. pp. 789, 790- Emerging c~~e Clau~ RGtrillni 00 sii>te fax: 
791 (1~atXlratln<J on proposl~on lhat federal consuw.. atlon: 87 Mi<:n.LHev.138 (1988}. see also HeUersteln. 
of the tax, the Wynnes challenged the Ilona! re<..tra1n1s are evaluated at the state level. not 'Is 'Internal Consistency' Dead?, Reflections on an 
denial under the Commerce Clause. the local levett Ttris issue Is tur1herexptore<1 below Evolvlng com:nerce aause Restraint on State Tal<il· 
See text accompanylr)ll notes 43-46 Infra.. 1100: 61 Tax L, Rrc.>v.1 0007}. Hellersteln. SMre ·T.'!XaUon 
Al th O ugh the CO U rt adverts to the s The term ·1u11 credit.' as us..od In the I ext means a credit rreattse. suiia note 4. , 4.161ll(dlscusslng ·internal 
pass-through nature of the Wynnes' againstata,on1ncometha11ssub/ectto~1xoo1hb)' conslstt'f)(:Y"doctrlne). 






tax, but simply looks to the structure 
of the tax at issue to sec whether its 
identical application by every State in 
the Union would place interstate 
commerce at a disadvantage as com-
pared with intrastate commerce~ 
Maryland's taxing regime indis-
putably flunked the internal consis-
tency te.st and the Court so held. After 
noting that applic.ation of the internal 
consistency test required that Maiy-
land's taxing sd1eme be evaluated as 
a whole fi.e., it must include consider-
ation of (1) the county portion of the 
tax on income thcit Maryland residents 
earn in Maryland. (2) the county por-
tion of the tax on income that Mary-
land residents earn in other States, and 
(3) lhe special nonresident county por-
tion of the tax on income that nonres-
idents earn in Maiyland: the Court il-
lustrated the internal consistency of 
Maryland's by the following example: 
Assume that e.very State imp~si:d the fol-
l!>l/#1'1$ ~"ll(!:$, Whi¢fi'are simllatl!J.M~ey-
land~ "ootinty• · arid "special ,nb'ill'e5ldi:nt" 
taxes: (I) a 1.25% tl':lx on int'Ome that res-
idents earn ln State, (2) a 1.25% tax on 
income that residents earn in other ju~ 
lisdictions, and (3) a 1.25% tax on in-
come that nonresidents cam in State, 
Assu,~ mrt.l:¢rthat two ~~;}1Pdl 
and :n'oo; bath, live in St1rti,-.,A/ h11Uhat 
April earns her income in State ·. A 
whereas Bob earns his Income in State B. 
fo '.this>dro,.i.ristance, Bob will mi. roQl'.C 
in¢t>rne ~ .~,:art April solely · . 
earns ln(;Qn'ie interstate; ,$~ . . . . 
will have to pay a l.251!f/ !W<'. ortly Of!~, 
to State A But Bob will have to pay a 
1.25% tax twice: once to State A, where 
he resides, and 1mc:e to Stat.e B, where he 
earns the income~ 
If this were all there was to Wynne-
that the Court's "existing Commerce 
Clause cases all but dictate the result" 
under a simple application of the in-
ternal consistency principle-it would 
hardly merit an article in THE JOURNAL. 
Nor would it explain why the Court 
took the case in the first place, which 
remains a mystery in any evenl;9 nor 
why it took the Court 28 pages to ex-
plain the supposedly preordained re-· 
suit; nor why rl1e case produced four 
different: opinions together with a bit-
ter 5-4 split on the outcome. For at 
least i\ partial ClCplanation of these 
questions, the article explores the 
"Unabridged Version· of the Court's 
opinion in Wynru below. Before that 
task is u ndert:aken, howevet; the article 
explores an alternative path that the 
Court might have taken to its decision 
that woul.d have led to a much 
shorter opinion and raised fewer 
questions than the Court's longer 
opinion has left in its wake. 
THE ROAD NOTTAJCEN10 
lhere was a straighter path than the 
one the Court took in Wynne to the re-
sult that it reached. In the interest of 
fulldisclosure. it was a path suggested 
by the Brief of the Maiyland Oiamber 
of Commerce as Amirus Curiae in sup-
port of the taxpayers, a brief that the 
author of this article helped write, but 
it also reflects views that the author 
has long held,n and that as the ensu-
ing discussion hopefully will demon-
strate, are still of some relevance, 
notwithstanding the Court's opinion 
in Wynnt. The straighter path was 
based on the fundamental proposi-
tion that longstanding Commerce 
Oause doctrine requires states taxing 
income on a residence basis to yield 
their taxing rights to states taxing the 
same income on a source basis to 
WALTER HELLERSTEIN is the Francis Shackelford Professor of TaxaUon and D1st1ngu1st1ed Research 
Professor at the Univc."1'.Slty of Georgia School of Law. cwuthor of the treatise state Taxatloo CThomsOn 
Reuters/WG&IJ. and editor ot this department tor THE JOURNAL Professor Hellerstein co-authored a 
.brief on behalf o/- the Maryland Chamber of Commerce as am1ciis curiae In support of the taxPaYers 
in 1,1,yrme. The views expressed in this artlele, however. are entirely his own and do not necessarily 
represent those of the Maryland Chamber of Cornmerca The author would like to thank Dan T. Co-
enen. Andrew Grace, Jerome B .. Llbin. Herman Rosenthal. and John A Swain for their helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft of this arUcle. All errors or omissions are the atithor's own. Copyright© 2015, 
Walter Hellerstein ,. · 
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avoid the inexorable double or mul-
tiple taxation that would result from 
the simultaneous exerci.se of both 
states' taxing rights. 
The DonnantCommerce 
Clause Forbids the 
Risk of Multiple Taxation 
For more than 75 years, the Supreme 
Court has steadfastly adhered to tl1e 
doctrine that the dormant Commerce 
Clause forbids state taxes that expose 
interstate commerce to a risk of mul-
tiple taxation to which intrastate com-
merce is not exposed.12 In Wtsttm Live 
Stock v. Bureau of Revtnut, 303 U.S. 250 
(I 938), the Court first artic.ulated the 
basic proposition that while interstate 
commerce mw,t "pay its way; the dor-
mant Commerce Clause protects in-
terstate commerce from "beading] ru-
mulative burdens not imposed on 
local commerce~ Shortly thereafter. in 
striking down a levy on dormant 
Commerce Clause grounds, the Court 
in J.D. Adams reiterated that funda-
mental principle: "Interstate commerce 
would ... be subjected to the risk of a 
double tax burden to which intrastate 
commerce is not exposed, and which 
the commerce clause forbids~ In Gwin, 
White & Prina, the court likewise con-
demned a tax under the dormant 
Commerce Cause because it exposed 
interstate commerce to "the risk of a 
multiple burden to which local com-
merce is not exposed~ JD. Adams and 
Gwin, Whit( fr Prince, of course, were 
the very precedents the Court invoked 
in Wynnl as "all but dictat(ingl" the re-
sult in the case. 
The Court has never wavered from 
its commitment to this basic tenet of 
its dormant Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence that is indispensable to 
the protection of free trade from bur-
densome taxes.11 Again, Wynne reflects 
STATE & LOCAL 
the same commitment to the avoid-
ance of multiple lax burdens. 
Resldence--Based Claims Must 
Yield to Source-Based Claims to 
Avoid Multiple Taxation 
Over the years, the Court has consid-
eK-<l a number of cases addressing the 
risk of multiple taxation that arises be-
c11use of the conflicting dairns of (1) 
the state of a taxpayer's residence to 
tax 100% of a taxpayer's income or 
property. regardless of its geographical 
source or location, and (2) the state 
where the income or property is 
earned or located to tax the portion 
of the income or property with its 
source or location (hereafter simply 
"source") in that state.14 The problem 
arises because, apart from the dormant 
Commerce Clause and the interests in 
free trade that it protects, the claims of 
both..the state of residence and the 
state of sourc.-e are legitimate. Although 
Wynne involved income rather than 
property, the ui1derlyit)8 Cqmmerce 
Clause question-how to.deal with 
competing daims based on residence 
and source in light of free trade con-
cerns-are common to both contexts, 
and the Court's underlying reasoning 
in both contexts, at least prior to 
Wynne. ap~rcd tobc ir1terch.angf!aple. 
The·~rt has lm'IS re,;plffi{i;~ the 
states' power to tax income and prop-
• If the Courts •ex;sUng Commerce ~use cases aiibut 
dictate the result reached In lhls case l)y Maryland's 
highest court· as the Court declared, one may won· 
der whY U,e Court did not simply cleny the Complrol· 
ler of the Treasury's petition for certiorari. On Its race. 
the case seemed to meet none of the criteria that the 
Court has esl.abllshed for determining Whether to 
grant certlOrarl from a stale court declslOrt namely. 
·a state court of last resort t1as decided an lrnl)O(tant 
federal question In a IN&,/ that conWd; with the docl· 
ston of another st.ate court of last resort or of a l.h~ted 
stares court of appeals"or "a state court.- haS decided 
an Important question of federal law that has not 
been but shoUld be. setlled by this C.ourl, or has de-
Clded an Important federal question in a w-.ry tnatcon-
fllcts with relevant decisions of this Court' U,S, 
supreme Court Rule 10, available at wwwsupreme· 
courtgov/ctruieSl2013Rulesofth<.-'Courtl)df 
10 Willi apologies to Robert Frost for wgge<;1,ng U1at po· 
etrv and taK raw rove anything In commo~ 
11 See. e.g. Hellerstein, Stare TaXilt/on Tr!!at1se, svpra note 
4. ,i 20.10l2l[bl (constitutional restraints on the denial 
by a taxpayer's state of resldP.r1<:-e or a credll for per-
sonal incorne taxes paid to other states); 5waln and 
Hellerstefn, ·state Jurlsdie~on to 'lax 'Nowhere· Activ· 
1tv.· 33 va., Tax Rev, 209 (2013). Needless to say, the 
niixt rev~lon of the treatise (cLii11uk1tlve supp/em<cint 
STATE & LOCAl. 
erty on the basis of residence and 
source. Thus, in the context of income 
taxation on the basis of residence, the 
Court has observed: "That the receipt 
of income by a resident of the terri-
lPl'Y of a taxing sciverelgntyis,a la'1-
able event is universally tet!)ghiied. 
Domicile itself affords a basis for such 
taxation'.'15 Accordingly; "[a]s to resi-
dents [a State] may, and does, exert its 
taxing power over their income from 
all sources, whether within or without 
the State ... 716 The rationale for allow-
ing states to tax residents on their in-
co me without regard to source is 
•founded upon the protection af-
forded to the recipient of the income 
by the state, in his person, in his right 
to receive the income, and in his en-
joyment of it when received;'11 as well 
as his "[elnjoyrnent of the privileges 
of residence in the state and the at-
tendant right to invoke the protection 
of its laws~1e 
The states' power to tax on the ba-
sis of source is no less well rcl'Ognized 
than their power to tax on the basis 
of residence.I' However. because the 
power to tax based ori .t,auri:edetives 
only from the protection that the 
states provide to ·persons, property, 
and business transactions within their 
borda's~20 it is necessarily more circum-
scribed than the. power to tax that 
flows from "[d]omicil itseJf.'21 Conse-
· · 2015·2. summer 20l5lwlll modify the cited dlsaJsslon. 
as appropriate, to reflect the Court's oplnlOn In Wyr111e. 
12 See generally Hellerstetn, S/,1/e T/v<.3//on Tteiit/se, wpra 
note 4, 1 409 (tracing development or doctrlnel 
u See, e.i ,Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of WSAnge/es,441 
US.434 (1979) ("It Is a commonplace of constltutlOnal 
jurisprudence that multiple taxation may wen be of-
fensive to the Cornrr~'fre Clause.:?; Mob/I OJI C()(p. v. 
Commr ot Taxes, 445 U.~ .. 425 (190C))(recogn1Zlng and 
addr'-'Sslng claims that U1e dormant Commerce 
Clause bars tax !hat ·imposes a burden on Interstate 
and fotelgn coomerce bY subjecting .• , lncorne to a 
substantial risk of mulUple taxal:IOn"l: Exxon C()(p. v. 
Wlsconstn Dep?. of R!ivenlJ/iJ,447 U,$,207 0980)(rev 
ognlzlng imd a<ldmslng a claim that the dormant 
Commerce Clause bars tax that 'sut)Jects Interstate 
business to ;in unfair burden of multi~! ta1<atlon">. 
MeadWestvaco Cc)(fl v. lllino/$ Oep? of RIM!nue, 553 
u.s, 16 (2008) ('The Commerce Clause forbids the 
siirtcs to k.w taXCffi that discriminate against Interstate 
commerce or that burden IL by subjecllng activities 
to mulUple or unfairly apportioned taxation, 1 
14 For ease or expositlon. the term 'source" IS used to 
mean a location. ottK...,. than the residence of the tax· 
payer, where a state rr.1y assert the power to tax 
based on ltS relationship Lt> the income or property 
In question,, In ttie context of Income taxatkm, the' 
quently, when states seek to tax non-
resident individuals and corporations 
using source as their sole jurisdic-
tional basis, their power extends only 
to the nonresident~· "property owned 
within the State and their business, 
trade, or profession carried on therein, 
and th.e tax is only on such income 
as is derived from those sources~zz It 
is worth observing that there is noth-
ing in Wynnr that undermines the 
foregoing principles. Indeed, Wynne 
fully erttbta<;~tl,¢ryt It is in the ,rec. 
oncili;ilfoh of these principles in light 
of the Commerce Clause prohibition 
of the risk of multiple taxation that 
Wynne's approach deviates from the 
Court's approach in its pre-Wynne case 
law as described below. 
When both the state of residence 
and the state of source have a legiti-
mate daim to tax income, there are 
wich:.<:sptead ungcrstandings that the 
suite ofrt'$l<:reh'.C¢ ordinarily yl.elds to 
the state of source to avoid double 
taxation. This is true as a matter of 
national .and international practice.23 
indeed, it is also true as a matter of 
subnational practice in the United 
States, a point the Court acknowl-
edged in Wynnt. The Court recognized 
that states taxing income on the basis 
of residence yield to states that tax the 
same inc.ume on the basis of source. 
observing that "the near-universal 
term 'source" ls normally used to desa1be the locallon 
where Income Is earned and tl1us IS taxable by a Ju, 
rlsdletlon other than the la><payer's residence; In Uie 
context of lllOllable or lntang,ble property taxation, 
the term ·s1tus· or "buslnesS situs· rather than ·source· 
Is typically used IP describe the IOcatJon where such 
property Is Situated and Is thus taxable by a IUrlSdlc· 
tlon other than the taxpayer's residence. 
15 Ne.v York ex reL Cohn v. Gr~ 300 us .. 308 0937), 
tll Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U,5; 37(1920), 
11 Lawrence v. State Tax Commn, 286 U $. 276 (1932). 
18 Cohn, supra note 15, 
19 CUrry v. McOln/es.'1, "YJ7 LJ.$ "357 0939)("(0ncome may 
be taxed both by the state where rt. rs earned and by 
the state ol,ltle reclplent'sdomldlE'.Protectlon. l:l4i1r1elll; 
and power aver the subject matter are not confined 
to ellher state:~ 
20 Shaffer, s1Jpra note 16 <emphasis supplied), 
21 Cohn, supra note 15. 
zz Shaffer, S1Jpra riote 16,, 
23 American Law Institute. Federal Income Tax Project 
/ntemattonal Aspects of Un/led states Income 7'//xa· 
t/on 6 (1987) ("[u)nder lntematlonally accepted prac· 
lice, It Is Incumbent 011 the domldlk1ry Jurls<llcllon to 
alleviate., double t.1xat1on by .. some reasonablt? 
means'), ... 
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state practice is to provide credits 
against: personal income taxes for . , , 
taxes paid to other States:24 
ff both the state of residence and 
the state of source could tax income 
or properly associated with interstate 
commercial activity, the risk of mul-
tiple taxation would be inevitable. Ac-
cordingly. at least prior to Wynne, the 
Court, in accord wit..\ lhe wideSpread 
understanding that the state of source 
has the stronger tax claim, consis-
tently interpreted the dormant Com-
merce Clause as requiring the state of 
residence to yield to the stdte of source 
whenever a.llowing both claims to 
prevail would result in multiple tax-
ation of interstate commerce. 
The Court articulated the underly-
ing principle in Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 
342 U.S. 382 (1952). The taxpayer, an 
Ohio-based corporation, owned boats 
and barges that it employed for the 
transportation of oil along the Missis·· 
sippi and Ohio Rivers. The vessels, 
though registered in CincinnatL made 
only ocr.a.sional stops in Ohio for re-
pairs. Their main terminals were in 
other states. Ohio assessed an ad val-
orem personal property tax on 100% 
of the value of the vessels. The Court, 
however; in Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge 
Lint Co., 336 U.S. 169 0949), had re-
cently sustained the power of a non-
domiciliary state to impose a source-
based tax on an apportioned share of 
the value of vessels that operated 
within that state. Ohio contended that 
Ott did not deprive the domiciliary 
state of the power to tax the entire 
value of the vessels, a power the 
domiciliary state thought it possessed 
under the Court's earlier doctrine. The 
Court flatly rejected Ohio's rontention, 
holding that the state of l't'.sidencc had 
to yield to the state of source to avoid 
11111~i1 T i . . . . ... ···· ...... . .... J.: 
24 For this proposition, the Court cited Hellersteln5tale 
Taxation Treatise 1 20.10, Pll 20·163 to 20·164.. 
25 Although Standard OIi technically raised only a due 
process l55ue, the language or the Courts opinion 
plainly speaks to dormant Commer-e Clause con· 
cems. In subsequent opinions. the ('.ourt expUcllly In· 
c.orporatf:d the principle of Standard OIi into Its dot· 
mant Commerce Clause doctrine, as the ensuing 
discussion re11eals; 
26 Emphasis added, 
Z1 See l!rlefol Ta~ Economist~ as Amici Curiae In Sup· 
port of Respondents 4. 
the risk of multiple taxation: 'The rule 
which permits taxation by two or 
more states on an apportionment ba-
sis precludes taxation of all of the 
property by the state of the domicile. 
Otherwise there would be multiple 
taxation of interstate operations . , . ~25 
Prior to Wynnr, the Court faithfully 
adhered to the view that the dormant 
Commerce Clause bar against multiple 
taxation requires that the power of one 
state to tax all of an interstate enter-
prise's property or income on a resi-
dence basis must yield to the power of 
other states to tax the same property 
or income on a source basis. Thus, in 
CtntralRR Co. v. Pmnsylvania. 370 U.S. 607 
(1962), the Court sustained the power 
of the domiciliary state to impose a tax 
on the full value of the taxpayer's 
rolling stock, but only because it had 
failed to establish that it was subjecl to 
an apportioned source-based taxc "in 
other i:,iates. As the Court obsetved, "a 
State c.asts no forbidden burden upon 
interstate commerce by subjecting its 
own corporations, though they be en-
gaged in interstdte trdnsport to nondL~-
criminatory property taxes; However, 
the Court squarely reaffirmed the 
teachings of Standard Oil, declaring that 
"'multiple taxation of interstate opera·-
tio n s' ... offends the Commerce 
Gause; and that "multiple taxation is 
possible . , . if there exists some juris-
diction, in addition to the domicile of 
the taxpayer, which may corn,tit:ution-
ally impose an ad valorem tax~ 
In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los An-
gdes, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), the Court en-
dorsed the same principle, observing 
that ·rnn order to prevent multiple tax-
ation of interstate commerce, this Court 
has required that taxes must be ap-
portioned among taxing jurisdictions, 
so that no instrumentality of com-
merce is subjected to more than one 
tax on its full value.· Turning to poten-
tial conflicts between source-based 
and residence-based taxation of the 
same property, the Court reiterated the 
source-trumps-residence principle in 
no uncertain tenns: ·n1e corollary of 
the apportionment principle, of cour'St~ 
is that no jurisdiction may tax the in-
strumentality in full. ·n1e rule wl 1id 1 
permits taxation by two or more states 
8 @ JOURNAL OF TAXATION. JUl.Y 2015 
on an apportionment basis precludes 
taxation of all of the prope1ty by the 
state of the domicile .... Otherwise 
there would be multiple taxation of in-
terstate operations: Standard Oil Co. v. 
Peck, 342 U.S., at 384-385~ 
ln Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissiona- of 
Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 0 980), the Court 
applied the same rule in the income 
tax context, reasoning that the dor-
mant Commerce Clause precludes 
one state from taxing all of a tax-
payer's income on a residence basis 
when another state has the power to 
tax an apportioned share of that in-
come on a source basis. In Mobi.l, the 
question was whether Vermont could 
tax on a source basis an apportioned 
share of the dividends that Mobil Oil 
Corporation, a New York domiciliary, 
received from its foreign subsidiaries. 
One of the arguments advanced by 
Mobil was that Vermont could not 
t1x an apportioned share of such in-
come because it would expose Mobil 
to the risk of multiple taxation in light 
of New York's alleged power as Mo-
bil's commercial domicile to tax the 
dividends on an unapportioned basis. 
The Court rejected the undedying 
premise of Mobil's argument It first re-
iterated the basic principle that the dor-
mant Commerce Clause would not tol-
erate the multiple taxation that would 
result from imposition of a tax on Mo-
bil' s dividends both ·by apportion-
ment" on a source basis and "by allo-
cation to a single situs" on a residence 
basis. A5 the C.ourt put it, "[t]axation by 
apportionment and by allocation to a 
single situs arc theoretically incommen-
surate, and if the latter method is ron-
stitutionally preferred a tax based on 
the fonner c;annot be sustained~ While 
multiple taxation of the same income 
was constitutionally unacceptable. the 
Court was nevertheless willing to 'as-
sume. for the present purposes, that the 
State of commercial domidle has the 
power to lay some tax on 1he appellant's 
dividend income~ze Howeve1; when it 
came to the ultimate question whether 
the state of residence trumps the slate 
of source in the face of conflicting 
claims to the same income, the Court 
reaffirmed the rule that residence must 
yield to source. Thu.s, although the state 
Sl"ATE & LOCAL 
of commercial domicile has the power 
to tax "some" of the appellant's divi-
dend income, "there is no reason in 
theo1y why that power should be ex-
clusive when tl1e dividends reflect in-
come from a unitary business, part of 
which is conducted in other States. In 
that situation, the income bears relation 
to benefits and privileges conferred by 
several Stales. These are the circum-
stances in which apportionment is or-
dinarily the accepted method" In short 
a residence-based tax "allocating" a tax-
payer's ~nlire i.ncome to a siJ)$le stati; 
did not prevail over a sour(.t:c~ tax 
apportioning a taxpayer's income to 
the states in which it docs business. 
Had the Court in y\,ynnr followed its 
et\ilier decisions requiring state taxes 
based on residence to yield to state 
taxes based on source, the decision 
would have followed easily. Maryland's 
raxing regime created precisely the risk 
of multiple taxation identified in the 
Court's earlier decisions. Maryland im-
posed a tax on all the income earned 
by its residents and <>n all th<: lnrqme 
earned in· Matyland by 11011,;ei;Jdetits. 
It failed to provide full relief against its 
residence-based tax (whether by a 
credit, apportionment, or exemption) 
for tdxes imposed by other states when 
the income Matyland taxed is earned 
in those slates and is also taxed there 
on a source basis. As a consequence, 
the risk of multiple taxation for resi-
dents who cross state lines to engage 
in economic activity was indisputable. 
Accordingly, under the settled law re-
flected in the Court's pre-Wynne dor-
mant Commerce Clause doctrine, 
Maryland, as the stnt-e of restpence. 
would h.aVe had to yield to claims of 
the state or st.ates of source. in order to 
avoid the multiple taxation that 




As noted at the outset of this art:ide, 
the Court in Wynn, explicitly repudi-
ated the proposition that its opinion 
"requires that a State taxing ba.sed on 
residence to 'recede' to a State taxing 
based on source~ This raises the ques-
.STAH & l.OCAL 
lions of why the Court rejected that 
proposition; where the Court's opin-
ion leaves the dormant Commerce 
Clause, in general. and more spec.ifi-
willy, the pre-Wynne dormant ·(::;qm-
inerf.'e Clause law (as we knewJt) ad-
dressed to multiple taxation; whether 
the changes that Wynne arguably 
made in the pre-Wynne law are signif-
icant as a theoretical and practical 
matter; and what que.stions arc likely 
to be encountered in light of Wynne. 
It is to these questions that the bal-
ance of this article is directed. 
Maryland's regime as a tax that fell 
within a familiar-perhaps the most 
familiar-dormant Commerce Clause 
rule invalidating state taxes, mmely. 
a tax that discriminates against inter-
state commerce. 
How did the Court accomplish this 
doctrinal solution? It did so by adopt-
ing a definition of• discrimination" ad-
vanced bv some well-respected aca-
demic ec~nomists. albeit a definition 
with which state tax lawyers (or, at 
least, this state tax lawyer) were gen-
erally unfamiliar. Specifically, the 
economists argued that the way to 
'l1teRejectionofthe determine whether a tax is discrimi-
CommerceCJause Doctrine natory is to cbmpare a tax on wholly 
That Source Trumps ltesJdence domestic inoomt' (defined as a tax th,n 
Perhaps the most specific-and sur- a resident pays on in-state source in-
prisil'1g"'.aspect: of Wynne was Jts rejec- come) with the combined tax on out-
tion of the generally accepJ~d propo- bound income (the tax the resident 
sition, which appeared to be solidly pays on incoin.ef:rom $0.ur<:es ilH>ther 
,groun<!lt!d. in the Court's dormant states) and il'lbound Income (the. tax 
Cornm:erce Oause precedents, that a the nonresident pays on income from 
residence-based tax must yield to a sources within the taxing state). If the 
source-based tax to avoid the multiple tax on the cross-border income Cin-
taxation that would result from hon- bound and outbound) exceeds the tax 
oring both taxing claims in full The on domestic income there is tax dis-
qµes;fio11 thus ~rises why the C'.oU:rt crimination. The economists charac-
a'dqpte~ tNs positi91\ espetjttlly: ll'.1 terized this discrimination as equiva-
Ushfoflts 9wn ~cognition thi:trihe lent to "an import or export tariff.'21 
spqrr.e,.tru:rnp~"'.rcsi~~;pril:\9plt re,- perhaps the quintessential violation 
fleeted "the near-universal state prac- of the Commerce Clause. 
tice: at least in th.e context of state per- Interestingly, the Court never de-
sonal income taxation. Although one scribed the economists' precise 
can only speculate about the answer, methodology for determining 
the most plausible explanation is that whether a tax is discriminatory. In-· 
th.is concession was essential to getting stead, it simply relied on the charac-
a majority of votes needed to invali- terization of the disparity identified by 
date the tax. Evidently there are some the econotnists a5 a "tariff.' noting that: 
Justices who are uncomfortable with "th[e] identity between Maryland's tax 
the Court "legislating" a rule of prior- and a tariff is fatal because tariffs are 
ity-no matter how widely accepted [tlhe paradigmatic example of a law 
that rule may be in theory. in practice, that discriminates against interstate 
and (prior to Wynne) in federal con- commerce; and that "tariffs ... are so 
stitutional law. · jii:!tt11tly unconstituti~nal ,that our 
So, faced with the reluctance of itases reveal not a sirt$!.e .attempt by 
some Justice~ to adopt a rule of pri- anySfo'l'tl'totm:aitone~ Mor~over, the 
ority. ~l:1.t;di¢lthf('.;burt do? It shoe- Coli.rt rioted that "when asked'a\:)out 
horne<l1th¢i~~m,tp,a doctrip.al mode the ... analysis made by amid Tax 
with which the wavering Justices Economists.,. coun.~el for Maryland 
would feel more comfortable, namely, :~'.$ponded: 'I do.nlt'dlspJ;it'e':ti1e·math-
that the Maryland scheme "discrimi- ·.,e},:iatics. TheylGl.e·m(!,Wher\'lhey shifl: 
nat:ed" against interstate commerce. from tariffs to income taxes:" How-
This maneuver permitted the Court to ever, the Court saw no reason why 
strike clown the tax without "legislat- "our analysis should change because 
ing" a rule of priority and to condemn we deal with an income tax rather 
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than a formal tariff.' Furthermore, the 
Court noted that "[n]onc of our dis-
senting colleagues dispute this eco-
nomic analysis~ 
Most significantly. the Court's em-
brace of the economists' definition of 
tax discrimination allowed the Court 
without adopting a priority rule for 
source over residence, to invoke the 
internal consistency test as the appro-
priate metric for "translating• the 
economists' definition of discrimina-
tion into familiar constitutional doc-
trine that would result in the condem-
nation of the Maryland tax. As the 
Court, observed, ·the internal consis-
tency test reveals what the undisputed 
economic analysis shows; Maryland's 
tax is inherently distTiminatory and 
operates as a tariff.' And in case the 
reader missed the observation the first 
time the Court made it, the Court sub-
sequently reiterated that "the intemal 
consistency test and economic analy-
sis ... confirm that the tax scheme op-
erates as a tariff and discriminates 
against interstate commerce~ 
In short the Court's doctrinal ap-
proach allowed it to invalidate the 
Maryland tax sd1eme under a familiar 
constitutional principle (the internal 
consistency test) based on bedrock 
dormant Commerce Gause jurispru-
dence (discriminatory taxes, in gen-
eral, and tariffs, in particular, consti-
tute virtually per se Commerce Gause 
violations) without "requir[ing] a State 
taxing based on residence to 'recede' 
to a State taxing based on source~ If 
such doctrinal legerdemain was the 
price of attracting five votes to con-
demn a tax regime that violates sound 
.. t§#·.· ... ·· 
28. ,-he principle that a Stale may r1ot tax value earned 
outside Its borders rests on Uie f undarnental rl:1QUlre, 
ment of both the Due Proc-ess aause ztnd COmrnerce 
Clauses that there t>e some deOnlte link. some mini· 
mum connec.tloo betweilr1 a state and the persor\ 
property, or transactlOn II. seeks to tax.~ AUled·SigfliJl 
Inc. v. Director. DlviS/ori or r,//)(n, 504 us. 768 099.?) 
Ontemal citation omitted). As l1ie Court ob<..erved In 
A/HerNS/g1111t, 'ttlhe reason the Commerce Cla\Jse In· 
dudes this llmll ls sell-evident In a Union ol 50 States. 
to permit ea,"h state to tax actlvltle~ outside Its bor· 
ders would have drastic consequences for the na, 
Uooal ,'COnorny. as businesses could be subject to se· 
w1e multiple taxation.· The Court has also artlCUlaled 
the 5am(J principle urider the "external conslstt'11cv· 
requirement, See Heller stein, Slaro T.1xation Tre;)t/Se, 
supra note 4, 'I 4.1612) (discussing ·extenl/11 coni;ls· 
tency" doctrlnel,.:The llmlts on extraterritorial or ex· 
temally Inconsistent taxes. however. do not. In and of 
and widely accepted norms of cross-
border tax. policy, perhaps one should 
simply be grateful for the result and 
not pursue this issue any further After 
all, there is the old adage about not 
looking a gift horse in the mouth. 
The Dormant Commerce 
Clause Prohibition of Tu:es 
creating me Risk of Muitiple 
Tu:Burdens After Wynne 
Despite the temptation to leave well 
enough alone, the Court's approach 
does raise a number of additional 
questions that warrant further explo-
ration. Perhaps the most fundamental 
question raised by the Court's opinion 
in Wynn, is this: Does the Court's full-
throated endorsement of the internal 
consistency principle for identifying 
unconstitutional "double taxation ... 
that discriminate[sl in favor of in-
trastate over interstate activity,' along 
with its rejection of judicially articu-
lated "priority" rules (such as source 
over residence) for avoiding cumula-
tive tax burdens, mean that internal 
consistency is the only principle (apart 
from extraterritorial taxation or "ex-
ternal consistency-211) for determining 
whether a tax imposes an unconsti-
tutional risk of cumulative tax bur-
dens in violation of the Commerce 
Clause? 
Such a reading of Wynne is certainly 
plausible. While the Court was careful 
•not to decide the L'Onstitutionality of 
a hypothetical tax scheme that Mary-
land might adopt" its analysis relied 
almost entirely on the internal con-
sL5tency test in evaluating the consti-
tutionality of alternatives to Mary-
themselves. prevent the states from taxing out-or-
state values on a restdence basis. because. as was 
noted earner. the Just1nca11on for re!ildence-based 
taxes rests on the 'telnJovment ol privileges or resl· 
dence In the stale and the attendant right lo Invoke 
the prot~'CLIOn ol 115 laws,' no( on the relatlonshlP of 
the state to valu..>s taxed, Cohn, supra note 15. 
29 The Court later reiterates this point citing Moorman 
for "dlStlngulshlng 'the potential consequences of the 
use of dlll'erent forrm,las by two states.' which IS not 
prohiolted by the Commerce Clause, from discrimi-
nation that 1nhere[sl In either State's lorrnula' which 
IS prohibited: 
JO Apart from extraterrltOrlal tru<atlon or external consts-· 
t.ency. Slee supra note 28:' 
31 Emptlasls added, . 
32 l:::mphasis added,, 
33 See supra note 28. 
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land's tax regime. Moreover, the 
Court's repeated invocation in Wynne 
of Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 
437 U.S. 267 (1978), in distinguishing 
between "(1) tax schemes that inher-
ently discriminate against interstate 
commerce, without regard to the tax 
policies of other states" and "(2) tax 
schemes" like those in Moorman 'that 
create disparate inceniives io engage 
in interstate commerce (and some·· 
times result in double taxation) only 
as a result of the interaction of two 
different but nondiscriminatory and 
internally consistent schemes• can be 
read as reflecting the Court's belief that 
an internally consistent tax. creating 
the 1isk of multiple tax burdens does 
not offend the dormant Commerce 
Clause.a 
In Moorman, the Court rejected the 
taxpayer's argument that Iowa's sin-
gle-fador sales formula, considered in 
conjunction with the similar three-
factor formulas of property, payroll, 
and sales employed at that time by 44 
of the 45 states other than Iowa, ex-
posed the taxpayer to an unconstitu-
tional risk of multiple taxation in vi-
olation of the Commerce Clause. In 
so holding the Court declared: 
The only conceivable constitutional 
basis for invalidati,ng the Iowa statute 
would be that the Commerce Oause 
prohibits any overlap in the computa-
tion of taxable income by the States. If 
the Constitution were read to mandate 
such precision in interstate taxation, the 
consequences would extend far beyond 
this particular case. For some risk of du-
plicative taxation exists whenever the 
States in which a corporation does busi-· 
ness do not follow identical rules for the 
division of income. Accepting appellant's 
view of the Constitution, therefore, 
would require extensive judicial law-
making. Its logic is not limited to a pro-
hibition on use of a single-factor 
apportionment formula. The asserted 
constitutio1'1al flaw in that formula is that 
it is different from that presently em-
ployed by a majority of States and that 
difference creates a risk of duplicative 
taxation. But a host of other division of 
income problems create precisely the 
same risk and would similarly ri~e to 
constitutional proportions. 
If the Court belkves that Moorman 
controls the outcome in Wrnne, inter-
nal consistency may well be a. sine qua 
non of a claim'° that a tax that creates 
the risk of multiple taxation prohib-
STATE & LOCAL 
ited by the dormant Commerce 
Clause in a post-Wynnt world. How-
ever, if Wynne is so read, it reflects a 
significant departure from prior 
precedent Moorman, after all involved 
a conflict between different states' 
sourcing rules, namely, determining 
the source of corporate income by 
formula. Although the risk of multiple 
taxation may have been palpable in 
the light of the then-existing configu-
ration of states' apportionment for-
mulas, the risk of multiple taxation, at 
least in principle, was adventitious. 
While a taxpayer with all its sales in 
Iowa but all its property and payroll 
in other states with three-factor for-
mulas would pay tax on 167% of its 
income (100% to Iowa and 67% to 
states where its property and payroll 
were located), a taxpayer with all its 
property and payroll in Iowa and all 
its sales in other states with three-fac-
tor formulas would pay a tax on only 
33% of its income (0% to Iowa and 
33% to states where its sales were 
made). In short; a conflict between in-
ternally consistent, but. divergent, 
sourcing rules can lead to overtaxa-
tion or undertaxation, assuming that 
exposure of 100% of the taxpayer's 
tax base (no more or no less) is the 
appropriate norm, which is the as-
sumption reflected in the internal 
consistency principle. 
Wynne, by contrast, involved a con-
flict between one state's residence-
based rules and another state's 
source-based rules, where the risk of 
multiple taxation was intxorablt not 
adventitious. Wholly apart from the 
specific question raised in Wynne 
(whether residence must yield to 
source in the taxation ofpersonaUn-
come), the more fundamental ques-
tion is whether a state seeking to tax 
lOOo/o of a tax base on some plausible 
basis (e.g., residence, location of eco-
nomic activity, location of property) 
must yield to the tax daims of other 
jurisdictions seeking to tax a portion 
of that tax base on some plausible ba-
sis (e.g., source. location of economic 
activity, or location of property). 
Prior to Wynn,. the Court generally 
resolved those conflicts, without re-
sort: to the internal consi~tency prin-
STATE & LOCAi. 
ciple, by requiring the state seeking to 
tax the entire tax "pie" to yield to the 
state seeking to tax only a "slice· of 
that "pie~ As the Court put it in Mobil 
Oil Corp. (discussed above), "[tlaxation 
by apportionment and by allocation 
to a single situs are theoretically in-
commensurate, and if the latter 
method is constitutionally preferred. 
a tax based on the former cannot be 
sustained'.'31 Accordingly, the Court 
sustained the more limited (but 
stronger) claim of the state seeking to 
tax the apportioned 'slice" of the pie 
rather than the unapportioned ·pie" 
in its entirety. Insofar as Wynne aban-
dons this preference in favor of inter-
nal consistency; paying equal respect 
to states' daims to all of a tax base 
and states' competing daims to only 
a portion of a tax base, as long they 
do not seek to tax both bases simul-
taneously (in violation of the internal 
consistency principle), Wynne has 
made a noteworthy modification in 
dormant Commerce Clause law. 
Further thoughts on Commerce Clause 
restraints on cumulative tax burdens and 
tntemalconststency. Although the fore-
going reading of Wynne ls plausible, it 
is not the only way to read the Court's 
opinion. In this connection, it is worth 
taking a closer look at the Court's in-
vocation of its gross receipts tax 
precedents from the late 1930s and 
1940s in support of its conclusion. It 
will be recalled that the Court declared 
that its decisions in J.D. Adams (1938), 
Gwin, White & Princt (1939), and Central 
Greyhound (1948) were "particularly in-
structive" precedents as 'three cases 
involving the taxation of domestic cor-
porations•n in which the Court struck 
down a state tax scheme that ·might 
have resulted in double taxation of 
income earned out of the State and 
that discriminated. in favor of domes-
tic over interstate state commerce': The . 
Court further noted that "we held that 
those schemes could be cured by 
taxes that satisfy what: we have sub-
sequently labeled the 'internal consis-
tency' test: 
The Court's description of these 
cases, while in service to an under-
stand ab le objective-condemning 
Maryland's residence-based tax as 
discriminatory for failure to satisfy 
the internal consistency test-does not 
provide a complete picture of their 
import:. Although these cases in-
volved "dome.stic" corporations, and 
thus "residents" of the st.ates in ques-
tion, the taxpayers' residence was of 
no relevance to the cases, and any 
implication that the cases involved 
residence-source conflicts (like the 
conflict at issue in Wynne) would be 
mistaken. In J.D. Adams, the Court ex-
plicitly noted that "[t]he tax is not an 
excise for the privilege of domicile 
alone"; rather it was ·a tax upon gross 
receipts from commerce~ Similarly, in 
Gwin, White & Pri.nct, although the tax 
was imposed upon a Washington 
corporation, that fact had no bearing 
on the Court's analysis, which turned 
on the measure of the tax "imposed 
upon appellant's activities in Wash-
ington~ In CmtralGllyhound. the Court 
did not even mention the residence 
of the corporation (the Wynm Court 
had to cite the dissent for that point), 
and the issue in the case was simply 
whether New York could tax all the 
receipts from "points within the State 
but over routes that utilize the high-
ways of Pennsylvania and New Jer-
sey.' To repeat: Not one of these cases 
involved as did Wynne, an unalloyed 
attempt to tax all of an individual's 
or entity's income or receipts simply 
because that individual or entity was 
domiciled or resident in the state. 
Furthermore, although the Court 
properly invoked these cases as sup-
porting. with the benefit of hindsight; 
the internal consistency principle, a 
fair reading of these cases does not 
support the proposition that the 'in-
ternal consistency· is the etclusiv~ te&t 
(apart from extraterritoriality or ex-
ternal consistencyH) for determining 
the risk of the exposure to unconsti-
tutional multiple tax burdens under 
the dormant Commerce Clause. In-
stead these cases represented a repu-
diation of the restrictive and formal-
istic Commerce Clause doctrine that 
created a tax-free zone of immunity 
for interstate commerce and adopted 
instead a more pragmatic approach 
that "mu.st accommodate itself to the 
double demand that interstate com-







merce must pay its way. and that at 
1he same tiine it shall not be burdened 
with cumulative exactions which arc 
not similarly laid on local busi-
nesses~34 Indeed, the Cou1t recognized 
in Wyn11e that "beginning with Justice 
Stone's seminal opinion in Wtslern Live 
Stock ... , and continuing through 
cases like J. D. Adams and Gwin, White 
& Prince, the direct-indirect burdens 
test was replaced with a more practi-
cal approach that looked to the eco·-
nomic impact of the tax~ 
Accordingly, while J.D. Adams, 
Gwin, White & Prince, and Central Grey-
hound contain language that antici-
pates the internal consistency princi-
ple, the cases may also be read for 1he 
broader proposition that reflected, 
and arguably continues to reflect, the 
Court's dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence. Thus, J.D. Adams held 
that Indiana could not impose a tax 
on the unapportioned gross receipts 
that an Indiana taxpayer received 
from its sale of machinery manufac-
tured in Indiana to purchasers in 
other states because the states in 
which 1he sales were made could also 
tax such receipts, thus creating a risk 
of a multiple tax burden on interstate 
commerce to which intrastate com-
merce would not be subjected. Simi-
larly, Gwin, White & Prince held 1hat 
Washington could not impose a tax 
on the unapportioned gross receipts 
that a Washington taxpayer received 
from the marketing of fruit shipped 
from Washington to o1her states and 
34 Western live Stockv. Bureau of Revenue. 303 U.S. 240 
09381 See generally Hellersteln, State Taxation Trea-
r;;e,supra note 4, '\I 409(traclng developrr~mt of rnul· 
~pie taxation docllinel. 
3S Although one might also say Uiat such taxes simply 
violate the requirement that a stale not lmpo~) ex· 
tr alerrdcx'lol. unfairly apport.kx·1ed, 01 exlemally lrn.1:,n· 
sis tent ta.<es. Sl.'!e surx11 note 28, that wo1,1rJ t~) rK> an· 
swer 111 the case of a tax baSE<l on residence nor. one 
might aroue, cm some other local event that was ar· 
guably coonec.ted to all of a taxpayer's Income or 
grossrecelpts 
M S1>.etextaccompa1w1ng notes 14·25supra, 
n Se.e Swain and Hetlerstcln. supra notcy 11. at 221. 226. 
38 Blttker. "The Taxation of Out-of.·State Tangible Prop· 
erty; 56 Yale L. J,640 (1947). Blttk<?r'; analy;ls did not 
address Commerce Cl~use ·restraints <>n state taXil· 
tlOn 
39 ·111 mathematics. a binary operation Is commutative 
If changing the order of the operands does not 
Change the result. .... ,. Most. Familiar as I.lie name of lhe 
property that says·') • 4 ~ 4 + 3' or ·2 x 5 • 5 x 2'.' See 
foreign countries because the states 
to which the fruit was shipped could 
also tax such receipts, thus creating a 
risk of a multiple tax burden on in-· 
terstate commerce to which intrastate 
commerce would not be subjected. 
Likewise, Central Greyhound held that 
New York could not tax the 
unapportioned gross receipts from 
transportation that were also subject 
to tax in other states, thus creating 
a risk of a multiple tax burden on 
interstate commerce to which in-
trastate commerce would not be sub-
jected. These cases can fairly be read 
a5 standing for the proposition that 
states that seek to tax 100% of a tax 
base on an unapportioned basis 
must yield to states that can tax 
the same receipts on some other 
plausible basis, whether or not the 
unapportioned taxes are internally 
inconsistenvs 
Finally, whatever one may say 
about post-Wynnt dormant Com-
merce Oause doctrine prohibiting in-
come and gross receipts taxes that 
create 1he rL5k of multiple tdxation, it 
seems clear that the rule requiring res-
idence to yield to source remain5 true 
in the context of tangible personal 
property (based on the precedents 
discussed above), to which the Wynne 
Court makes no reference. 1he expla-
nation for this difference lies in part 
in the fact that the cases involving 
tangible personal property implicate 
Due Process Clause as well as Com-
merce Oause concerns, even though 
en.wlklpedlaorg/wlkl/Comrnutallve_propertyffCorn· 
mutatlve_operatlonsJn. everyooy.Jifa 
40 Hellersteln. et al.. ·commerce Clause Restraints on 
State Taxation After Jefferson Lh1es,• 51 Tax L. Rev. 47 
(1995). See also Hellerstein. State Tax11t/o/J Treatise, 
s11pra rl0te4. 118.09(3J[dl 
41 As Mitt Romney famously deelare<i See www.wash· 
1ngtonpost.rc0m/polltlcs.lmltt·romr1eY·S&Y!l'(".Orpora· 
t10ns,,11-e·people/2011/00/TI/glQABw?.:l81.story.htmL 
,u Proft'S.'iOI' Coenen r:iut the relevant point this waY: 
!Tlhls effort to dlstlngulsl1 between natural and artlf\dal 
persons rn'!kes no sense •. Indeed. l/1e effort Is pcrver.;e 
because It would st~p ttie laws aid from 01111narv lndl· 
vlduafs, while anording al~out constltu!lonal protectklr1 
to corporate tirarl\S. ll may or may not be lhal ·corpora· 
Uons are peopl!!." But one thing Is ror sure: People are 
people. And on no sound tt1eory ,;t,ould IJ(tuai p..ople 
be aeprived of dormant Commerce c.,u~ protec:Uons, 
even a5 those protections operate to afford complete 
shelter to arUflcla1 entities Who owe IJ'lelr very eiustell(.e 
to the munmcence of the slatr..Coenen. 
-Why Wynne Should Win." 67 Vand, ,L Rev. En Banc 
217. "l2fr27 (2014), 
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(as noted above) tJic Court has assim-
ilated its Due Process Clause prece-
dents involving tangible personal 
property into its Commerce Clause 
cases involving the same issue.36 'fhus, 
in contrast to cases involving income 
and intangible property. where the 
Court has made it dear tl1at the Due 
Process Clause does not bar double 
taxation by the state of residence and 
the state of source,31 the Court's prece-
dents limiting states' power to tax tan-
gible personal property on the basis 
of residence when o1her states have 
power to tax such property on the 
bash; of source or ·situs" may be ex-
plained on the theory that tangible 
personal property cannot. as a matter 
of principle, be ·1ocated• in two states 
at once and the source state's power 
to tax such property effectively ·re-
moves" that property from the state 
of residence, without establishing a 
"priority" rule over legitimate claims 
based on source and residence to the 
same tax base. Although such analysis 
may seem somewhat strained, and 
Boris Bittker in a characteristically 
trencha.nt critique has argued that it 
is not analytically defensible under the 
Due Process Clause,38 the 'priority" of 
source over residence appears to be 
alive and well in the context of state 
taxation of tangible personal property. 
Other Commerce Clause Questions 
Addressed In Wynne 
In 1he course of its opinion in Wynne, 
the Court addressed and resolved a 
number of subsidiary questions that 
are worthy of brief discussion. 
Taxes on gross recclptsversus taxes on 
net income. As already observed, the 
Court in Wynne relied heavily on gross 
receipts taxes (J.D. Adams. Gwin, White, 
& Prince, and Central Greyhound) in de-
termining the appropriate analytical 
framework for adjudicating the mn-
stitutionality of a net income tax. In 
response to Justice Ginsburg's claim 
in dissent that the Court had tradi-
tionally distinguished between gross 
receipts and net income taxes, the 
Court rejected the claim as inconsis-
tent with its contemporary approach 
to state taxation under the Commerce 
Clause: ·we see no reason why the 
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distinction between gross receipts and 
net income should matter, particularly 
in light of the admonition that we 
must consider 'not the formal lan-
guage of the tax statute but rather its 
practical effect'." In the Court's view, 
"the discarded distinction between 
taxes on gross receipt-., and net income 
was based on the notion, endorsed in 
some early cases, that a tax on gross 
receipts is an impermissible 'direct' 
and 'immediate' burden on interstate 
commerc..-e. whereas a tax: on net in-
come is merely an 'indirect and inci-
dent.al' burden." 
One intriguing question raised by 
the Court's repudiation of the "dis·· 
carded distinction" between gross re-
ceipts and net income taxes, whirh jus-
tified the Court's J'(']ance in Wynne on 
gross receipts tax precedents to evalu-
ate the constitutionality of a net in-
come tax, is whether this doctrinal 
development: is subject to the commu-
tative principle,)9 so that net income 
tax precedents may now be invoked 
in evaluating the constitutionality of 
gross receipts taxes, !hls .. \1V.e$ti.on h; 
pa.rtlrulady relevantto the qvestion of 
falr i\pportionment: Although JJ), 
Maw; Gwin, WhW:. &:f'rintt i\.nd Cmtr:oJ 
Grtyhoundstrongly support die pl1'.ipq-
siti6n thatsrossrecei{)ts@xes, li~e net 
income taxes, are subject to the Com-
merce Clause de.mands of fair appor-
tionment, the Court in fact has been 
less than rigorous in implementing 
those demands when adjudicating the 
constitutionality of gross receipts taxes 
measured by inbound sales as distin-
guished (at least in JD. Ada.ms and Gwin, 
Whitt 6'.Prina) from gross receipt raxes 
measured by outbound sales. 
In a series of cases involving Wash-
irigton's gross receipts tax-the tax: at 
issue in Gwin, Whitt & Prince-the Court 
sustained taxes measured by the un-
appdmdrted>gross rece~let~m .inter-
. statelic!tivitf 6ver the objections that 
the levies were unfairly apportioned. 
Thus in General Motors Corp. v. Washing-
ton, 377 U.S. 436 (1964), the Court sus-
tained, over Commerce Claus obj<:c-
tions, the state's tax on all the gross 
receipts that General Motors derived 
from its sa.les of cars to Washington 
retailers, despite the factthatmanufac-
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tu ring and assembly occurred out5ide 
the state. The Court's rationale for sus-
taining the tax was that it was imposed 
on "instate activity'.' Similarly, in Stan-
dard Pressed Sttd Co. v. IJqJartmml of Revmur, 
419 U.S. 560 (1975), involving the ap-
plication of Washington's tax to the 
unapportioned gross receipts from 
sales that an out-of-state supplier 
rrladc to the Boejng Company, the 
Court declared that 'the tax is on the 
gross receipts from sales made to a lo-
cal consumer; whirl, may have some 
impact on commerce .... Yet ... it is 
'apportioned exactly to the activities 
taxed; all of which are intrastate~ Sub-
sequently, in Tyltr Pipe Industrirs, Inc. v. 
Washington State Dcpartmmi of Revamc, 
483 U.S. 232 (1987), involving the ap-
plk:t)li©U of Was.hitigl-qn's tax to the 
UQijf!p,or:(lpn«J ~ipts from sales that 
an out-of-state manufacturer made to 
an in-state customer; the Court de-
clared: "Washington tax:es the full value 
of receipts from in-state wholesaling. .. ; 
thus, an out-of-state manufacturer 
selling in Wa<Jhington is subject to an 
unapportioned wholesal.e tax: even 
though the value of the wholesale 
transaction is partly attributable to 
manufacturing activity carried on in 
another State that plainly has jurisdic-
tion to tax that activity. This appor-
tionment argument rests on the erro-
neous assumption that through the 
[business and occupation] tax, Wash-· 
ington is taxing the unitary activity of 
manufacturing and wholesaleing ... 
[T]he activity of wholesaling-whether 
by an in-state or an out-of-state man-
ufacturer-must be viewed as a separate 
activity conducted wholly within 
Washington that no other State has ju-
risdiction to t.ax.'.' 
lhe Court's decisions in GmeralMo-
lors, S1andanl fussed Steel, and Tyl.tr Pipe are 
difficult, if not impossible.. to square 
with a principled implementation of the 
fair apportionment principle. As Justice 
Brennan observed in his dissent in Gm· 
rral Motors-a dissent that applies equally 
to the Court's decisions in Standard 
Prl'Sied Steel and Tyle.r Pi.pr -"if commercial 
activity in more than one State results 
in a sale in one of them, that State may 
not claim as all its own the gross re-
ceipts to which the activity within its 
borders has contributed only a part 
Such a tax regime must be apportioned 
to reflect tlie business activity within 
the taxing State:' Indeed the present au-
thor has argued at length elsewhere 
that the Court's analysis in the Wash-
ingtonG1ses i5 unfuithfi.il to the fairap-
pot1:ionrrt<1'nt reqtiiremml as reflected 
in the Court's net income tax prece-
dents, in addition to being in tension 
with its gross receipts tax mlings in JD, 
Adarrts, Gwin, White & Prina, and Cmtral 
Greyhound. 40 The purpose here, however, 
is not to reargue the case, but simply 
to suggest that Wynne may have given 
the argument a new lease on life. After 
all the rhetoric of Wynne obliterates the 
distinction between gross receipts and 
net income taxes. Furthermore, the 
Court's opinion in Wynnr reinvigorates 
the application of the fair apportion-
ment principle to gross receipts taxes 
both directly (by its reliance on ].D. 
Ada.ms, Gwin White & Prina, and Catlral 
Grq,hound) and indirectly by suggesting 
that precedents requiring fair appor-
tionment of net income are equally ap-
plicable to gross receipts taxes. 
Talolsonlndivldualsversustaxesoncor-
Pomtions. ln justifying its reliance on 
].D. Adams, Gwin White & Prina, and Cm-
tral Greyhound-all of which involved 
corporations-to invalidate Maiyland's 
personal income tax: scheme.. the Court 
rejected the contention that dormant 
Commerce Oause principles provided 
less protection to individuals than to 
corporations. The Court found it "hard 
to see why the dormant Commerce 
Oause should treat individuals less fa-
vorably than corporations~ since any 
tax, whether imposed on a corpomtion 
or an individual, may burden interstate 
commerce, and there was no basis for 
distinguishing between the two classes 
of taxpayers based on the services they 
received from the state. So whether or 
not'"corporations are people:41 it seems 
fair to conclude that insofar as Com-
merce Clause protections are con-
cerned people are corporations, or at 
least cannot be treated worse than cor-
porations when it comes to taxes on 
interstate activity,<12 
Tbe Commerce Clause protects resi-
dents from their own state taxes. The 
Court in Wynm had another oppor-
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tunity to consider its observation in 
Goldberg v, Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989), 
that 'lilt is not a purpose of the Com-
merce clause to protect state residents 
from their own state taxes~ As the 
Court observed in Wrme, it had earlier 
·repudiated that dictum in West Lynn 
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 
(1994), where we stated that '[s)tate 
taxes are ordinarily paid by in-state 
businesses and consumers, yet if they 
discriminate against out-of-state 
products, they are unconstitutional:" 
Notably, the dissenting opinions of 
both Justice Scalia and ofJustice Gins-
burg sought to resuscitate the Cour1'.s 
remark in Goulberg in challenging the 
residents' attack on Maryland's taxing 
scheme. For the second and, one 
would hope, the last time, the Court 
repudiated its ill-considered dictum in 
Goldba-9, noting that it had entertained 
many dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges brought by state residents, 
including in Goldberg itself. 
hnpactof Wynne on 
Local Income Taxes 
One question not addressed in Wynne-
although it might have seemed rele-
vant because of the opinlon's focus on 
the "county portion of the tax-was 
the impact of the case on local income 
taxes. As explained above,43 this was 
not an issue in Wynne itself; because 
the county portion of the tax was, in 
fact, a "state" tax as a matter of state 
law; 'Jl1e important point here, as afoo 
noted, is that this would have been 
true as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law, even if the county portion 
of the tax were independent of the 
state portion of the tax for state law 
purpose.s, because, for fl.>d.eral consti-
tutional purposes, the distinction be-
tween state and local taxes has no 
meaning-they are all exercises of 
"state· power insofar as the Constitu-
tion is concerned.44 Indeed, the Mary--
land Court of Appeals made this very 
point in its opinion below: "whether 
the t.ax is nominally a state or county 
tax is irrelevant for purposes of analy-
sis under the dormant Commerce 
Gause because a state may not un-· 
reasonably burden interstate com-
merce through its subdivisions any 
more than it may at the srate level~•s 
Brief elaboration on this point may 
nevertheless be useful because of the 
differences in the ways that local taxes 
treat nonresidents a.s well as in the 
way that state..s grant credits for taxes 
imposed by other states' localities, and 
the implications of Wynne for this dif-
ferential treatment 
First to restate the governing prin-· 
ciple, there is no distinction for federal 
constitutional purposes between state 
and local taxes for dormant Commerce 
Clause purposes. The principle was 
clearly articulated in a case raising the 
question of whether an out-of-state 
vendor, which had sufficient nexus 
with a state to enable the state to re-
quire the vendor to collect the state's 
use tax; could also be required to col-
lect local use taxes in local jurisdktions 
where, if the locality were viewed as a 
st.ate, the taxpayer would not have suf-
ficient nexus for use tax collection pur-
poses. In Aldcns, Inc. v. Tully, 49 N.Y.2d 
525, 404 N.E.2d 703 (1980), an out-of-
state, mail-order business was lkensed 
to do business in New York and, 
through a wholly owned subsidiary. 
maintained offices and employees at 
four different locations in the st.ate. 1he 
taxpayer challenged the right of the 
st1tr. to require it to collect local, as dis-
tinguished from state, use taxes on 
goods sold and delivered by it to pur-
chasers in every locality within the 
state, because its only contact with 
many of the localities was by mail and 
common c.arrie1: 
After noting that the statute clearly 
required any vendor maintaining a 
place of busin('.ss in the state to collect 
local as well as ~tate use taxes, the New 
York Court of Appe,ils rejected the tax-
payer's constitutional objections to the 
imposition of the local use tax collec-
tion obligation. The court acknowl--
edged that an out-of-state vendor 
whose only contact with a state was 
through the mail or mmmon carrier 
could not be required to collect the 
state's use tax. The court then declared: 
Petitioner argues by wishful extrapola-
tion that the imposition of the duty of 
collection of all local use taxes within the 
State on a seller which is located only in 
particular counties within the State and 
whose only connection with buyers in 
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other local tax areas L5 by mail or by 
common carrier is similarly infirm. 
However. simply because there are con-
stitutional limitations on the burdens 
that may be placed on interstate com-
merce, it docs not follow, nor is there 
any precedent for holding, that burden 
is to be measured by fiirther compart-
mentalization of each state into its mu-
nicipal subdivisions. No historical 
predicate is advanced to indicate that in 
assuting protection of commerce among 
the severai States, any such int.rasiate 
partitioning was contemplated, and pt:--
titioncr cites no Supreme Court cases so 
holding.46 
What does this mean for the con-
stitutionality of "local" income taxes 
after Wynne? Because local income 
taxes are simply state taxes for dor-· 
mant Commerce Gause purposes, the 
appropriate way to analyze such taxes 
is to consider them as part of the 
state's tax structure (a5 in Wynne). So, 
for ex.ample, if a locality (like New 
York City) imposes an income tax 
solely on its residents without giving 
any credit for income taxes that its 
residents pay to other states, such a 
tax would be treated as part of New 
York's state tax structure. That tax 
structure would he viewed as impos-
ing a conventional (and internally 
consistent) statewide income tax on 
all residents and nonresidents of the 
state, with a credit for taxes that resi-
dents pay on income earned in other 
states, along with an unconventional 
(but internally consistent) tax con-
fined to New York City residents with 
no credit for taxes that such city res-
idents pay to other states. If internal 
consistency is the only dormant 
Commerce Clause requirement for as-
suring that a tax does not impose a 
risk of multiple tax: burdens, an issue 
we have addressed above, the New 
York regime would survive constitu-
tional scrutiny. 
By mntrast for example, if a local-· 
ity Oike Kansas City, Missouri) im-: 
poses an income tax on residents and 
nonresidents but denies a credit for 
income taxes that its residents pay to 
other states, such a tax would be 
treated as part of M.issouri's state tax 
strud:ure. That tax structure (analo-
gous to the tax structure at issue in 
Wynne) would be vi.ewed as imposing 
a conventional (and internally con-
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sistent) income tax on all residents 
and nonresidents of lhe state, with a 
credit for taxes that residents pay on 
income earned in other states, along 
with an unconventional (and inter-
nally inconsistent) tax regime con··· 
fined to Kansas City residents, and to 
nonresidents of the city earning in-
come within the city, but with no 
credit for t.J.ie income tax that Kansas 
City resident5 pay on income earned 
in other states. 
Finally, it is worth considering the 
obligation of a state like Kansas to 
provide a credit against its state in-
come tax for the income truces that its 
residents pay to Kansas City, Missouri. 
Following the logic of the preceding 
disrussion, assuming Kansas generally 
imposes a tax on the income that its 
residents earn from all sources, as well 
as a true on income that nonresidents 
earn from sources in Kansas, Kansas 
would be required, under internal 
consistency analysis, to provide a 
credit against the Missouri tax (in-
cluding the tax imposed by localities 
in Missouri). 
This is because if every state 
adopted a tax regime that imposed a 
tax on all of the income that its resi-
dents earned from all sources and all 
of the income that nonresidents 
earned from sources within the state, 
but gave a credit only for the portion 
of other states' taxes that were labeled 
··state" rather than "local" taxes, a truc·-
(l!lyer confitµ(18.her.~¢thrify \q'a ~il)gle 
~ta~e would pay cmly thJ:! ~~~s l¢)tied • 
by a single state (whether denomi-
nated ·state• or "local") whereas a tax-
PJW<rWho ventured across stat~Jines 
would pay both the ~fla~ll!" ta;~9her 
state of residmce as well as the por-
tion of the other state's tax denomi-
nated a "local" tax. 
Wynne and Intemallylnconsfstent 
Deflnttions of Resident 
The personal income taxes of many 
srates define as resident,; (tax.able on 
all of their income, regardless of 
source) not only those individuals 
who are domiciled in the state but 
also individuals who exceed a speci-
fied threshold of presence in the state 
Cso-called "statutory" residents). New 
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York, for example, defines a "resident 
individual" for personal income tax 
purposes as someone "who is not 
domiciled in this state but maintains 
a permanent place of abode in this 
state ... ~47 and spends in the aggregate 
more than one hundred eighty-three 
days of the tax year in this state. If 
every stdte adopted New York's defi-
nition of "resident~ taxoavers who 
maintained their do~dl~ i~ one state 
but spent more than 183 days in an-
other, where they maintained an 
abode, would be exposed to a greater 
tax burden than taxpayers who con-
fined their activities to a single state. 
The former would be treated as a res-
ident of two states, subject to tax on 
all their income without regard to 
source and, to the ex.tent that the in-
come did not have its source in an-
other state (e.g., income from intangi-
ble investments not connected with a 
trade or business), often without any 
credit for the taxes paid to the other 
state. The latter, by contrast, would 
pa:y taxes on a residence basis to a 
~ihgl\Z state only and; even if !hey paid 
taxes to other states, would receive a 
credit for such taxes that (by hypoth-
esis) would be imposed on the basis 
of source. Hence such statutes clearly 
flunk the internal consistency test. 
Nevertheless, the few courts that 
have addressed taxpayers' claims that 
internally inconsistent definitions of 
resident for personal income tax pur-
poses are invalid under the dormant 
Commerce Oau~-e have rejected these 
daims."11 They have done so, however, 
not on the ground that the residency 
definitions survive scrutiny under the 
internal consistency test, a determina-
tion that would be difficult, if not im-
possible, to sq~are with the test. 
,i!j '5ee supra note I( ... 
44 Id. 
"5 Mary/and State Comptmller of the 7l'easury v. W)tnoo, 
431 Md, 147, 64 A,Jd 453 (Ml;l, 2013), 
~G Compare to Otyof Hoover v. Ollver & Wright Motors. 
Inc: .. 730 5o.2d 60B (AlaJ999) (sustaining wer due 
process ob)ecHons state's authority to permit munic-
ipalities to Impose local Alabama sales taK outside 
their corporate limits but within their police JurlSd!c· 
tlon. bec,1use state could delegate to municipalities 
power to levy taxes tl1at was coextensive Wjth the 
state's taxing powerli 
if1 N.Y. Tax Law§ 60S(b)(1)(8). 
Rather, these courts have held that the 
taxpayers' claims do not implicate the 
Commerce Clause at all. 'lhus, in Ia· 
magni v. Tax Appcals 1i-ibunal, 91 N.Y.2d 
530, 695 N.E2d 1125 (N.Y, 1998), the 
New York Court of Appeals dismissed 
the "internal consistency· attack on 
New York's residency definition by a 
New Jersey domiciliary who worked 
in New York. where he maintained an 
abode, and was thus a New York res-
ident under New York's statute, be-
cause the personal "income tax does 
not fall on any interstate activity, but 
rather on a purely local occurrence-
the taxpayer's status as a resident of 
New York State."49 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court rejected a similar at-
tack on Minnesota's residency defini-
tion on the ground that the claim was 
not cognizable under the Commerce 
Clause because it did not involve in-
terstate commerce.so 
The holdings of the New York and 
Minnesota courts were open to seri-
ous question even prior to Wynnt. 
Thus, as th.e author argued elsewhere 
long before Wynne was on the hori-
zon. the New York Court of Appeals's 
rationale-that taxing a resident on all 
of his or her income raises no Com-
merce Clause issue because it falls "on 
a purely local occurrence·-·cannot 
be reconciled with the U.S. Supreme 
Court's repudiation of a similar argu-
ment advanced by the taxing author-
ity in Camps N,:wfound!Owatonna, Inc. v. 
1own of Harrison~S1 In Camps Newfound/ 
Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 
U.S. 564 (I 997), the Court held that 
the Commerce Clause applied to a 
claim that a local property tax statute 
discriminated against interstate com-
merce by denying a property tax ex-
emption to charitable institutions that 
48 Luther v. Comml$Sloner of Revenue. 588 N.W. 2d soi' 
(Minn •. 1999): Tamagnl v. Tax Appeals Tribunal. 91 
NY.2cf53Q 695 N£2d 1125 Cl998l. 
411 See also Noto v. N~;,,, York Slill.e Dept of T//x'rland Fin,, 
2014 NY s11,, Op 3057B(U){Trlal Order)(Sup. Cl. SUffOII< 
Cty. 3/3114) . available at www.d'll..>ckpclinUhomson• 
reutersJ:orn (dOuble t.,~atlon of ln.estmenl Income 
of taxpayers. wl'lO W(,,,re resklents ol boU1 Conm.x:Ucul 
arid New York under each states law, did not Vfolate 
Commercf1 or Due Process Clause), . 
so Lulh<.'.1: .supra note 4a 
SI Hellersteln. State TaxalJon rreat/se. supra note 4. , 
20.03[.1] C"Constltutlonallty Undc~ the Commerce 
Clauoo or 'lntemalty 1nconsl51e11r 0en111t1ons of 'Resl· 
clEJll'.l 
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I 
were operated principally for nonres-
idents. In so holding, the Court re-
jected the taJdng authority's claim that 
the dormant Commerce Clause was 
inapplicable because a local real estate 
tax was at issue: "A tax on real estate, 
like any other tax, may impermissibly 
burden interstate commerce~ More-
ove1; the Court continued "ltlo allow 
!l C::i'!'.lf·p fr\ ~1u-'\'irl t·hA c+,.i,~h,,.ar r,:( t-h~ 
1,,1, ..... l.'-4\.\.. '-~ UVV.lU U,L..._ ._.\.l.11,,..L~,t\,..;,f V.t U.l\,. 
dormant Commerce Clause by the 
simple device of labeling its discrimi-
natory tax a levy on real estdte would 
destroy the barrier against protection-
ism that the Constitution provides'.' In 
short ifit is interstate commerce that 
feels the pinch, it does not matter how 
local the operation which applies the 
squeeze:' A personal income tax 
regime that exposes taxpayers who 
cross state lines to greater tax burdens 
than those who stay at home would 
seem to implicate the Commerce 
Clause, even though the discrimina-
tion depended on "a purely local oc-
currence"-the taxpayer's status as a 
"resident~ 
Whatever the force of these argu-
ments prior to Wy1tnt, Wynne, at a min-
imum, has provided taxpayers with 
additional ammunition to attack in-
ternally inconsistent definitions of res-
idence for personal income tax pur-
poses. The Court in Wynnt relied 
extensively on Camps Ntwjound, refer··· 
ring to the case no less than eight 
times in the opinion and quoting the 
case for the proposition that "'[al tax 
on real estate, like any otha tax, may im-
permissibly burden intetstate com-
merce' (emphasis added); to rebut the 
suggestion that a personal income tax 
somehow enjoys imm.unity from 
112 Heflefslefn. State Taxation Treatise. supra note 4. 1 
20.10!21 ('Limitation of Credit to Income DerfVC<l l'rom 
Sources In 011,er States'.,>,, 
113 Compare to, Reg;\262-l<b)(S) <rommutlng expenses 
are nondedu<:llble perscmal expenditures for federal 
Income lax purposes}. Flowers. 326 us,. 465 (1946) 
(same), 
114 See. e.g. Rosen. 'W)lnne, Cloud Computing. and State's 
Deference to Another; State Tax Notes. 618/15, p, 745 
C'New York state taxpayer; should be cognizant of 
the Wynne dt>clslon and shOUld consJder fifing refund 
claims 1r th~'Y have paid-or wlll pay-tax to New York 
State as a statutory r~'Sldent = 'l. 
Commerce Clause strictures. More-
over, as already noted, when two 
states tax an individual on a residence 
basis, even though both states will 
generally provide a credit for taxes 
that their residents earn from sources 
in other states,S2 the credit will not ex-
tend to income that does not have its 
source in another state, such as a tax-
payer's investment income. Indeed, 
this description fit the taxpayer in Ta-
magni, an investment banker who 
lived in New Jersey but commuted to 
work in New York, where he main-
tained an apartment To be sure, one 
might argue that the internal consis-
tency problem confronted by taxpay-
ers surh as Tamagni do not implicate 
the Commerce Clause because they 
are caused by a personal decision to 
live in one state and work in another.s:i 
Nevertheless, Wynne has almost cer-
tainly increased the vulnerability of 
internally inconsistent definitions of 
residence to attack under the dormant 
Commerce Clause, and it is only a 
matter of time before those attacks are 
launched.114 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most significant questions 
ra.ised by Wynnr, which has been 
saved to the end to reward readers 
who have had the perseverance to 
read this far, are what practical impact 
the decision is likely to have and what 
the case (and the various opinions it 
spawned) says about the health of the 
dormant Commerce Clause and its 
prospects for future. As a practical 
matter. it seems quite unlikely that the 
case will lead to significant changes in 
55 This assumes that the WY/Ille should be read as en-
dorsing such a regime. whlch as suggested above. ls 
a Plausible, but not the onfy p!auslble reading that 
Wynne may be given;~ text accompanying notes 
28-·37 supra. 
Sil Brier or the 1n1ernmion,11 MunlCJpal Lawyers As.~ocla-
tl.c,n, The United States Conference ol MaYors. The 
N.1t1onal As.c;oclatlon of Counties. The International 
City/County Management Assoclatlor1 and The Marv--
land A~soclatlon of Counties as Amici Curiae In Sup· 
port or l'etlttoner 16. Comptroller ot the Treasury v. 
Wyrme (No. 13·485), 
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what the Court described as 'the 
near-universal state practice to pro-
vide cTedits against personal income 
taxes for ... taxes paid to other States'.' 
Although in principle states might 
abandon their internally consistent 
residence-credit regimes, which tax on 
the basis of residence and source, for 
an internally consistent residence-
only scheme, that elirninates the 
source-based tax,ss this seems highly 
improbable in light of the reaction of 
voting residents to the adoption of 
such a regime. At the local level, how-
ever. Wynne is likely to have more of a 
practical impact because "many states 
and municipalities do not grant a 
complete credit to their residents for 
all income taxes paid in other juris-
dictions."" It rema.ins to be seen 
whether states and localities respond 
to the problem that Wynne creates for 
such regimes by adopting credits for 
taxes for their residents, eliminating 
the source-based tax on nonresidents, 
or some other internally consistent al-
ternative. 
As for the heallh of the dormant 
Commerce Clat.Lc;e, it seems to have 
survived Wynne essentially intact, with 
relatively minor doctrinal effects, 
some of which may actually have 
strengthened its condition. Thus while 
the Court may have weak~ned dor-· 
mant Commerce Oause restraints on 
internally consistent taxes that create 
the risk of multiple taxation, it may 
have strengthened the clause in reject'" 
ing distinctions (advanced by the dis-
senting opinions) between gross re-
ceipts taxes and net income taxes and 
between corporations and individu-
als. Moreover. while Justice Scalia and 
Justice Thomas reaffirmed their abid-
ing hostility to basic dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine, seven Justices 
agreed it has a continuing role to pl.ay 
in restraining state tax power, even if 
only five Justices believed that free 
trade principles 0utwelghed principles 
of state sovereignty in Wynn, itself. For 
the moment at least, the Court has 
stayed the course of the dormant 
Commerce Clause .. ,. 
:,lATf & t..OCAl. 
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